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Abstract
In the first essay I estimate the effect of a tuition subsidy, in the form of
in-state tuition for undocumented immigrants, on the college enrollment decision of
non-citizen Mexican immigrants. Using data from the Current Population Survey,
I capture the variable impact of the policy across age by estimating the impact on
two different age groups. I also estimate the differential effect across genders. The
policy increases the college enrollment among non-citizen Mexican immigrants. The
subsidy is associated with a 1.5 percentage points (or 15 percent) increase in college
attendance of younger immigrants aged 18 to 20 years old. Older immigrants, aged
21 and 22 years old, are more responsive: their college enrollment doubles with the
introduction of the in-state tuition policy. Irrespective of age, the subsidy increases
the likelihood of college attendance more for men than it does for women. Subsidizing
the cost of college results in an 7.7 percentage points (or 86 percent) increase in college
attendance of men while women’s participation drops by 72 percent. Irrespective of
age, married women are more likely to drop out of college when in-state tuition is
offered. The college participation of U.S. citizens is trivially impacted by the in-state
tuition subsidy to undocumented students.
The second essay concentrates on answering the question of whether couples
strategically time their divorce so as to minimize their joint tax bill. Previous empir-
ical literature that analyzes the changing trends in the family dynamics often rely on
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identifying the demographic, the sociocultural, as well as the economic factors that
influence those changes. The role of the income tax code and the tax liability faced
by each individual according to marital status has only recently been considered as
a possible influence on the likelihood and timing of divorce. Using household data
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, I build a parametric model of the divorce
timing decision as a function of the change in the tax burden caused by whether the
divorce takes place by the end of the year or not.
Results provide evidence that individuals do respond to tax incentives and
changes in the marriage tax penalty alters the relative value of divorcing early. A
doubling of the relative marriage tax price is going to reduce the probability of accel-
erating the divorce by 3.2% when the price is computed under the assumption that
the spouse with the higher income gets the dependents. The effect is slightly larger
(i.e. 3.7%) when the relative marriage-tax price is computed under the assumption
that the spouse with the higher income gets the dependents and also gets the ”Head
of Household” filing status.
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Chapter 1
The Effect of Tuition Subsidies on
Higher Education Enrollment of
Mexican Immigrant Students
1.1 Introduction
States differ greatly in how they charge illegal residents for higher education.
Some states had enacted laws that offer them in-state tuition if they enroll in public
schools (Olivas, 2009). Other states are concerned with the effect of such legislation
on the enrollment of citizens, and have passed laws explicitly denying undocumented
immigrants the option of paying in-state tuition. Informed public policy depends
crucially on understanding how subsidies affect the enrollment decision of citizens
and illegal immigrants.
In this paper, I use data from the 1997 to 2008 Current Population Surveys to
assess the effect of offering in-state tuition on college enrollment. I model whether an
individual is attending college as a function of personal characteristics, state specific
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variables, and tuition. I find that subsidizing the cost of college has a large positive
effect on the enrollment of non-citizen Mexican immigrants. College attendance in-
creases among young immigrants, aged between 18 and 20 years old, and it doubles
among older immigrants aged 21 and 22 years old when they have the opportunity of
paying in-state tuition.
One of the arguments against subsidizing tuition is that it might channel
educational resources away from the native-born students. Some also fear that the
policy might encourage future inflows of undocumented immigrants since affordable
higher education will signal that illegal immigration is actually rewarded (Berger,
2007; Redden, 2007). I address here only the first concern, examining whether the
policy displaces any citizens from higher education institutions. The data show that
providing in-state tuition to undocumented students has a trivial impact on the college
participation of U.S. citizens.
Despite its importance for public policy, the current literature has not analyzed
how subsidizing the cost of college affects college enrollment among illegal immigrants.
Kaushal (2008) provides the only published empirical study that asks whether sub-
sidies for undocumented immigrants have any effect on their college enrollment. She
finds a positive and significant causal relationship between the education subsidy
and the college enrollment of the undocumented students. Providing in-state tuition
results in a 2.5 percentage points (or 31 percent) significant increase in college en-
rollment of young adult non-citizen Mexicans, and has no significant effect on the
educational outcomes of natives.
Kaushal’s analysis relies on the assumption that the subsidy has the same
effect across all age groups and the same impact across all states. The policy is more
likely to have a larger impact on the college decision of those that are 18 or 19 years
old, and the subsidy is less likely to increase the likelihood of college attendance for
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someone who is older and has been out of high school for a while. Given the large
variation in tuition that public universities charge resident and nonresident students
across states, the subsidy is likely to have a different impact from state to state.
An aggregate estimate confounds the true effect of the policy and cannot provide
a clear assessment of how the in-state tuition changes the behavior of its intended
beneficiaries.
In this paper, I estimate the effect of the subsidy separately for specific age
groups and for each state. I also exclude from the sample the 17-year old illegal
immigrants since they are less likely to be affected by the subsidized education.1 I
capture the differential effect of the subsidy on young and older adults by estimating
the impact on two different groups. The younger group consists of those between the
age 18 and 20 years old, while the older group includes those aged 21 and 22. The
subsidy is associated with a 1.5 percentage points (or 15 percent) increase in college
attendance of younger immigrants while older immigrants are more responsive. Their
college enrollment doubles from 5 to 10.9 percent in response to the subsidy.
The effect of the in-state tuition subsidy also varies considerably across states.
Tuition is a critical factor in enrollment decision and a significant indicator of ed-
ucational quality provided.2 My empirical specification also controls for the direct
effect of tuition on college attendance of undocumented immigrants. This captures
the differential impact of the subsidy across states. If subsidized in-state tuition is
offered by only low quality schools that do not have a great reputation for higher life-
1Table D.1 in Appendix D provides detailed estimation of the impact of the in-state tuition by
age and state. I conduct a similar estimation for Kaushal’s sample (1997-2005) and similar effects
are present; indicating that 17 years old adults are negatively impacted by the policy, while those
aged 18 and 19 and almost twice as likely to attend college in response to in-state tuition subsidy.
These results are available in Appendix D, Table D.3.
2The idea that tuition reflects educational quality was first introduced by Spence (1973) in which
a higher tuition rate acts as a signal to potential students of the high quality of education offered by
the school. Thus, a state can only charge high tuition if there is some positive value to that state’s
higher education.
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time earnings, then the policy might have no impact on undocumented students. The
policy might not encourage them to undertake the investment and enroll in college.
Similarly, if tuition subsidies are offered only in states where tuition is high, then
resident tuition charges may be so large even after the subsidy is offered that imple-
menting the policy does little to encourage enrollment. I estimate the subsidy to have
the greatest impact on college participation in California (5.2 percentage points or
44 percent increase), Texas (3.1 percentage points or 29 percent increase) and Wash-
ington (4.9 percentage points or 89 percent increase) while non-citizen Mexicans in
Oklahoma and Nebraska are dropping out of college.
Differences in college attendance across genders have been systematically an-
alyzed in the literature. Existing evidence shows that women are more sensitive to
college costs and are more likely to attend college when the attendance cost is re-
duced.3 At the moment, however, there is no published analysis on gender effects for
undocumented immigrants. This paper also explores the difference in the response of
undocumented men and women to the in-state tuition subsidy. For undocumented
immigrants, the overall college enrollment rate for women is slightly larger than that
for men. Irrespective of age, the subsidy increases the likelihood of college attendance
more for men than it does for women. Subsidizing the cost of college results in an
7.7 percentage points (or 86 percent) increase in college attendance of younger men
while women’s participation drops by 72 percent. Similar results are present for older
men and women.
The analysis of gender differences suggests that men are more responsive to
price reductions in getting a higher education than women. In order to explain this
surprising effect I analyze whether marital status constitutes a significant factor that
3Dynarski (2007) shows that state merit aid scholarship programs have a significant positive
impact on the college attendance of women by resulting in a 6.3 percentage points increase in
attendance.
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drives the result. Married men compared to single men are less responsive to the price
reduction. For women, however, marital status has a significant impact on the college
decision and married women are more likely to drop out of college. Among young
married women, the price reduction results in a 9.2 percentage point dropout rate.
Older married women are dropping out at a lower rate and price reduction results in a
7.2 percentage point decrease in their college enrollment. Given the positive response
for married men, this result might suggest that women are more likely to drop out of
college and join the labor market in order to take care of household and increase the
potential of future earnings in the household.
1.2 In-State Tuition Policy
The debate of providing school related benefits to illegal immigrants can be
traced back to the Plyler v. Doe case in 1982 when the U.S. Supreme Court granted
undocumented immigrant children with the right to attend public schools at no charge
to them.4 Under this decision public schools cannot engage in any action that would
deny students access to education based on their immigration status. Although this
verdict has granted undocumented immigrants the right to free public education, it
does not guarantee free access beyond the K-12 level. The Plyler decision did not
establish the rights to public higher education for immigrants.
Prior to 1996, public universities in a few states, such as California and New
York, offered in-state tuition to undocumented students that met certain residency
requirements. In 1996, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
4In Plyler v. Doe (1982), the Supreme Court extended the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to undocumented immigrants and stated that undocumented children have
the same right to a free public education as U.S. citizens and permanent residents. Undocumented
immigrant students are obligated, as are all other students, to attend school until they reach the
age mandated by state law (Olivas, 2009).
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(IIRIRA) set the federal rules for states’ implementation of in-state tuition policies for
illegal immigrants. The main provision of this act, referred as section 505, was that the
Federal government banned public colleges from offering undocumented immigrants
in-state tuition unless out-of-state U.S. citizens that satisfy the same requirements
were also offered the lower tuition.
The federal ban set by the IIRIRA, however did not prohibit states from offer-
ing in-state tuition benefits to undocumented immigrants. During the last ten years,
legislators in thirty states have considered legislation that would allow undocumented
immigrants to receive in-state tuition. Legislatures in Texas, California, Utah, New
York, Washington, Oklahoma, Illinois, Kansas, New Mexico and Nebraska have en-
acted laws that grant illegal immigrants the right to public education at a resident
tuition price.5 These states have to provide the same in-state discount rate to current
residents of other states who previously went to high school and graduated in the
state. For instance, a resident of Oregon who attended high-school for three years in
Washington and graduated from a high-school in Washington is eligible for in-state
tuition in both Washington and Oregon.
in Washington state, if a 20 year old adult that is a U.S. citizen has lived
in the state for three years immediately before receiving a high school diploma but
moved to Oregon after graduation and intends to return to college in Washington,
public universities and community colleges in this state need to charge him or her the
in-state tuition fee.
Three of the five states with the highest proportion of undocumented popu-
lation in the country, California (22.7%), Texas (12.2%) and New York (7.7%), have
adopted in-state tuition policies. Texas became the first state that enacted this type
5Undocumented immigrants become residents of the state only for the purpose of qualifying for
the subsidized in-state tuition.
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of legislation in 2001. According to the Higher Education Coordinating Board, three
years after Texas enacted the legislation, 3,792 undocumented students attended pub-
lic colleges and universities in Texas. This represent a ten-fold increase since 2001.
Although most states do not offer any financial aid for illegal immigrants, students
in Texas, Oklahoma and Utah are eligible to get state financial aid in form of grants,
scholarships and loans. The state financial aid helps reduce even more the cost of
attending college. During the 2004-2005 academic year in Texas, there were a total
of 1,362 undocumented students that were awarded state aid amounting to a total
of $5,561,028.6 Table A.1 in Appendix A provides detailed information on the states
that offer in-state tuition and the year when the law was enacted, as well as whether
the state offers state aid to undocumented students.
In all states that offer in-state tuition, in order to be eligible an undocumented
student will have to meet specific residency requirements. In most states, eligibility
requires a student to have attended school in the same state for at least three years.
In New York and Oklahoma only 2 years of state residency are needed to establish
eligibility, while New Mexico requires students to reside in the state for only 1 year.
In all ten states, the student is also required to have graduated from high school or
received a GED in that state. Additionally, each undocumented student is required to
sign an affidavit stating intent to legalize his or her status, except for those living in
New Mexico.7 Due to the IRIRIRA, citizens who meet these criteria are also eligible
for subsidized education in those states.
6The numbers are provided by National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs
(NASSGAP) and represent less than 1 % of total aid offered in the state.
7California is the only state that has a clause in its in-state tuition law that makes student
information obtained through the citizenship affidavits confidential (California, Assembly Bill 540,
Chapter 814 (2001)). Non confidentiality might impact negatively the number of students who want
to take advantage of the policy since entire information could be made available to legal authorities
and thus increasing the likelihood of deportation.
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1.3 Theoretical Framework and Literature Review
Becker (1964) provides a theoretical framework on the choice of schooling. The
decision of getting a higher education depends upon the costs incurred in obtaining
a college degree and the expected stream of future benefits from getting a college
degree. A rational student will undertake the investment as long as the expected
future benefits, such as higher future earnings, exceed the costs.
For the undocumented students in the U.S., higher education not only offers
the option of greater future earnings and improved future labor market opportunities,
but also provides them with increased opportunity to legalize their status in the coun-
try. A college degree can provide the immigrants with a set of skills that make them
more valuable for employers and thus more classifiable for employment based visas.
For instance, higher education makes EB3 and H1B visas accessible to immigrants.
College education for undocumented students can also improve their likelihood to
marry and thus allow them to legalize their status (Duncan and Trejo, 2007). Given
those opportunities, a reduction in tuition could encourage more undocumented stu-
dents to seek a college degree.
The undocumented student, however, might face a different cost-benefit analy-
sis. The fear that applying for resident tuition will result in greater risk of deportation,
in addition to the uncertainty that there will be any real returns in the labor market,
make the undocumented student less likely to take advantage of the subsidized educa-
tion. Once the student signs the affidavit that as an undocumented student he or she
will pursue to legalize his status, and given the non confidentiality clause that comes
with the in-state tuition reduction in nine of the ten states, chances of deportation
are increased. On a similar note, the limited number of employment based visas that
are available each year generates uncertainty about whether the college investment
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will indeed pay off in the way that it will actually improve the chances of getting a
job in the U.S.8
The low income in the families of undocumented immigrants makes higher
education less affordable and it can also force the undocumented student to join the
labor market and earn lower wages in low skilled jobs as a way of helping with the
financial situation of the family. In 2008, 65 percent of the foreign born population
between the ages of 17 and 24 were participating in the labor market. Similarly, 64
percent of non-citizen young Mexicans between the ages of 17 and 24 were employed.
Together, those factors can help explain why price reductions, even though quite
substantial in some of the states, might not encourage undocumented immigrants to
take advantage of the subsidized education in those states.
The existing literature consists of a significant number of studies that analyze
the relationship between costs and college enrollments. Leslie and Brinkman (1987),
as well as Heller (1997) provide an extensive survey of the literature on the relation-
ship between prices and enrollment in higher education. They conclude that higher
tuition costs do indeed result in decreased college enrollment. The role of educational
related policies, such as subsidies, financial aid and grants offered to students, has
also been intensively investigated in the literature. A significant amount of research
concentrated on the effect of those educational related policies on the college enroll-
ment decision among different social and ethnic groups. Enrollment rates are more
responsive to changes in the cost of attending college for lower income students and
underrepresented minorities (Ellwood and Kane, 2000; Heller 1997).
As previously mentioned, Kaushal(2008) provides the only empirical study
that analyzes the effect of subsidized education on the educational attainment of ille-
8According to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, each year there are at least 2800 EB3
visas for each country. H1B visas are capped at 65,000. Both legal, such as foreign students, and
illegal residents compete for this limited number of visas (USCIS, 2009).
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gal immigrants. Using data from the monthly outgoing rotation files of the CPS, she
estimates the effect of the policy on a sample of young adult foreign born Mexicans.
The main finding of her study is that the policy of offering in-state tuition to undoc-
umented students is associated with a significant increase in the college enrollment
rate. The proportion of young adult Mexicans that are enrolled in college increases
by 2.5 percentage points. The policy is also estimated to have no impact on college
attendance of U.S. citizens.
1.4 Data
The empirical analysis uses data from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
from 1997 to 2008. The CPS is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households. Each
household in the CPS is interviewed each month for 4 consecutive months, then
ignored for 8 months, then interviewed again for 4 more months. Similar to Kaushal
(2008), restricting the sample to the monthly outgoing rotation groups (i.e. MORG
files) I get similar but less precise results than using each monthly survey.9
The monthly CPS provides individual detailed demographic characteristics
and economic related information, thus facilitating access to a significant amount of
control variables that can explain the existing variation in college attendance. The use
of the CPS is advantageous because this survey also collects data on the citizenship
status of foreign born individuals, as well as data on the country of birth and the
arrival year in the United States.
The main drawback of this survey is the fact that it does not include informa-
tion on the visa status of immigrants, thus making it impossible to identify accurately
9The MORG files include only the households interviewed during the 4th and the 8th interview
month. The monthly rotation outgoing group consist of approximately 30,000 individuals for each
month (NBER, 2008). Estimation results based on the MORG data only are available upon request.
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the illegal immigrants in the United States. As the visa status is not recorded, the
survey confounds legal and illegal immigrants. The survey is also likely to under-
count the number of illegal immigrants since they are less likely to participate in the
survey due to fear of being deported. According to the Census Bureau, Census and
CPS data undercount the undocumented by 10 percent. Kaushal (2008) provides a
rough estimation of the size of the downward bias that arises due to these problems.
There are 80% illegal immigrants in the U.S, and thus undercounting will result in a
8 percent bias that impacts the main effect of interest.10 Additionally,the presence of
20 percent legal immigrants will add to the bias such that there will be a 28 percent
downward bias in the estimated effect of interest.
Given that undocumented immigrants are difficult to identify, and because
immigrants from Mexico constitute the largest share of illegal immigrants, this study
is based on a sample of young adult non-citizens from Mexico. In 2008, immigrants
from Mexico represented 60 percent of the entire undocumented population in the U.S.
(Passel, 2009). The sample is further restricted to all Mexicans who have arrived in the
United States after the year 1987. This restriction is imposed because all foreigners
who arrived in the United States prior to 1987 were legalized under the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986. In order to satisfy the residency requirement for
in-state tuition eligibility, the sample is further restricted to all Mexicans who have
lived in the country for at least as many years as are required to satisfy state eligibility
requirements for in-state tuition. For the states of New York and Oklahoma I impose
a 2 year restriction. For New Mexico I impose a 1 year restriction. For the other
seven states that adopt in-state tuition, I use a 3 year restriction.
Monthly state unemployment rates are provided by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
10According to Passel (2005), prior to 2005 over 80 percent of immigrants from Mexico are un-
documented.The undercount percent (i.e. 8 percent) is computed as follows: 80% illegal immigrants
multiplied by the 10% undercounted illegal immigrants.
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tics, while the state minimum wage is made available by the U.S. Department of
Labor. For states that do not have a minimum wage, such as Alabama and South
Carolina, I use the federal minimum wage for that year. Data on the average aca-
demic tuition rates for both residents and non residents, by state and year, are pro-
vided by the Higher Education Coordination Board surveys. Data in those surveys
provide a close approximation of state averages based on tuition charges at 214 state
public institutions. The sample includes tuition data for both undergraduate public
universities and community colleges. However, the sample does not include tuition
information for community colleges in North Dakota as data is not available for all
years. On a similar note, undergraduate tuition for universities and colleges does not
include the states of Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii and Wyoming due to lack of consistent
tuition series for those states. Thus, all five states mentioned above are dropped from
the analysis. Tuition fees and minimum wage are deflated by Urban CPI and all
dollar values are in constant 2008 dollars. A complete description of how the data
sample was created is included in Appendix A.
Summary statistics for the main samples used in the analysis (i.e. non-citizen
Mexicans, Latino (not Mexican) immigrants, non-Latino immigrants, as well as two
distinct citizen groups) and state-year level data are presented in Table 1.1. The
younger group, those aged between 18 and 20 years old, are more likely to attend
college than the older adults (i.e. those aged 21 and 22 years old). Across the
foreign born non-citizen groups there is a significant difference in the proportion of the
population that attends college. This is true regardless of the age group considered.
For the Mexican group, only 12 percent of the young adults attend college. In contrast,
for the same age group, college attendance is significantly higher among U.S. citizens
(i.e. 38 percent participation rate for all U.S. citizens aged 18 to 20 years old and 29
percent for the U.S. citizens with Mexican parents). In terms of age and gender there
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are no major differences across the groups. With respect to marital status, across
all groups considered, older adults are more likely to be married. For the sample
of immigrants from Mexico the proportion of married adults over the age of 21 is
twice as large as the proportion of young married adults (i.e. 33 percent versus 16
percent). Regardless of the age group considered, immigrants from Mexico have the
largest proportion of married individuals compared to the other groups. There are
no major significant differences across the non-citizen immigrant groups in terms of
the average number of years they have been in the U.S.
1.5 Empirical Model
The main objective of this study is to determine the impact of subsidized
education on the college enrollment of undocumented immigrants. I model whether
or not an individual is attending college as a function of personal characteristics,
state specific characteristics, and tuition prices. The starting point of my empirical
approach is that the impact of in-state tuition varies across younger and older adults.
The effect of the subsidy also varies across states and controlling for tuition prices
might help explain some of this variation. Undocumented immigrants do not qualify
for any legal financial aid and tuition corresponds to a large share of their cost to
attend college. For each age group considered (i.e. 18 to 20 and 21 to 22 years old),
the effect of eligibility for in-state tuition on college enrollment of non-citizen young
Mexicans in those groups, is estimated by the following regression model:
Collegeijt = α1ISTjt + α2OSTjt + α3ISTjt ∗ Policyjt (1.1)
+ α4OSTjt ∗ Policyjt + α5Policyjt
+ ZjtΦ +XijtΓ + δt + δj + δm + uijt
i = 1, ..., N (persons)
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j = 1, ..., 51 (states)
t = 1997, ..., 2008 (years)
m = 1, ..., 12 (months).
The dependent variable, Collegeijt refers to college enrollment and is recorded
as 1 if the individual was attending college one week prior to the survey interview
and 0 otherwise. Given the nature of the CPS survey, there is no distinction made
between whether an individual attends a 4-year or a 2-year college. Thus, this de-
pendent variable refers to the overall college enrollment. College attendance depends
on in-state tuition (IST ), out-of-state tuition (OST ), the policy of granting illegal
immigrants in-state tuition (Policy), and the interaction of the policy variable with
tuition levels. It also depends on a set of individual characteristics (X), a set of state
specific characteristics (Z), and year, state and month fixed effects.
The policy variable and tuition are the key explanatory variables in equation
(1). The variable Policyjt controls for the presence of education subsidy. It is coded
as 1 if a state j offered in-state tuition to undocumented immigrants in year t, and
0 otherwise. This indicator variable is matched by month and year to the exact
date when the legislation became effective rather then when the legislative bill was
passed. The policy variable is lagged by one year since policy announced during an
academic year will have an impact on college enrollment and educational outcomes
after at least one year.11 Based on the proposed model, the estimated effect of the
in-state tuition on the college education of undocumented youth depends on the
level of tuition charged by public universities for resident and non-resident students
(i.e. α3ISTjt + α4OSTjt + α5). The price of attendance related variables, ISTjt
11Table B.2 in Appendix B provides detailed estimation of the impact of the in-state tuition by
age and state when the policy variable is coded without the one year lag. Comparing those results
to the one-year lag results presented in Table B.1 it is clear that the policy is more effective one year
after the enactment.
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and OSTjt, correspond to the state average resident and non-resident undergraduate
tuition fees charged at 4-year public universities and colleges in state j and year t.
By directly controlling for the tuition prices, this specification allows me to obtain a
finer measurement of how the in-state tuition policy affects college enrollment.
The coefficient α3 estimates the effect of in-state tuition fees on the college
enrollment of those that live in a state that offers in-state tuition benefits relative to
those that live in a state that does not offer the subsidy. Similarly, α4 estimates the
effect of non-resident tuition prices for those undocumented Mexicans that live in one
of the ten states that offer subsidized education relative to those that are not eligible
and live in states that charge non-resident tuition. Intuitively, given that once eligible
a student does not face the high non resident prices, this coefficient is expected to
be zero. Any other value is more likely to reflect a quality measure of the college
education offered in the state. Thus, a positive relationship between the non-resident
college price, when the student is eligible for in-state tuition, and the probability of
attending college might be interpreted as evidence that the state offers a high quality
of education relative to states without the in-state tuition policy.
Using the model described in equation (1), I also estimate the impact of the
subsidy when tuition levels control instead for prices charged at community colleges.
On average, community college prices are about a third of the price charged by public
universities. For instance, in 2008 the average resident tuition for community colleges
in the state of Virginia was $2,404, while public universities in the same state charged
resident student $6,854 in tuition fees. Out-of-state prices show the same type of di-
vergence, with an average of $7,659 for non-residents that attend community colleges
and a high $17,150 for those out-of-state students that attend public universities.
Given those significant differences, and given the fact that undocumented students
come from lower income households, community colleges could represent a more ac-
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cessible option.
The vector Zjt includes time varying state characteristics such as the monthly
unemployment rate, the state minimum wage, the proportion of the adult (aged 30
to 54 years) non-Hispanic white population with at least some college education, as
well as the proportion of the adult (aged 30 to 54 years) Mexicans with at least a high
school diploma. Those two proportions are computed from the CPS by using a three-
year moving average and are included in the model in order to control for state-specific
trends in education as well as for trends in educational aspirations of Mexicans.
The state minimum wage provides a proxy for forgone income while in college. The
monthly unemployment rates control for the economic conditions prevailing in the
state. This also provides a proxy for the outside options that are available to those
not in college.
Individual characteristics are included in the Xijt vector and include the fol-
lowing: age (included as a dummy variable for each year of age), sex, marital status
and the number of years lived in the U.S. I expect that those individuals that have
lived in the U.S. for a longer period of time to be more likely to enroll in college since
they get better accustomed. An immigrant that has lived longer in the country is
more likely to be familiar with the American system of higher education, more likely
to get a high school degree, and more likely to master the English language.
State fixed effects (δj), month of the year effects (δm), and year fixed effects
(δt) are also included in order to control for the variation in college enrollment and
educational attainment. Monthly fixed effects are included in order to control for the
low college enrollment during the summer terms. Year fixed effects control for the
existing time trends in the proportion of undocumented students that are enrolled in
college for all the states in the sample.12 State fixed effects are included in order to
12I use the school fiscal year, July 1st through June 30th. Using the calendar year does not result
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control for intrastate variation caused by any unobservable predictor or observable
predictor that is not explained by the covariates included in the model. For instance,
average differences in the amount and availability of financial aid offered by the states,
as well as average differences in the number of teachers available or the amount of
government finance toward public education, are all going to be captured by the state
fixed effects. I also include state-specific linear trends in order to ensure that pre-
existing trends do not confound the effect of the policy on the educational outcomes
of undocumented young adults. Additionally, in order to control for the differences
in college enrollment between men and women across time I also include separate
female-specific year effects.
The effect of the policy is also estimated on two additional groups of non-
citizens who are less likely to be undocumented: non Mexican Latino immigrants
and non-Latino immigrants. According to the Pew Hispanic Center, 30 percent of
the foreign born population from other Latin America countries and 12 percent of
the foreign born from region outside of Latin America are undocumented. The non
Mexican Latino sample includes a large proportion of immigrants from countries
such as Cuba, Ecuador and Dominican Republic while the non Latino sample consists
mainly of immigrants from Asia, Africa and Europe. These samples are also restricted
to immigrants that arrived after the year 1987 and that have lived in the country for
at least as many years as are required to satisfy state eligibility requirements for
in-state tuition.
Kaushal (2008), uses the non-Mexican Latino and the non-Latino immigrant
groups in order to test the validity of her results. She uses these quasi-control groups
because immigrants in these groups are more likely to be legal temporary residents,
such as foreign students, or legal permanent residents. Foreign students do not qualify
in any difference in the estimates.
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for the in-state tuition subsidy and permanent legal residents are always eligible for
in-state tuition. Because of this, immigrants in these groups are less likely to be
the beneficiaries of in-state tuition subsidy. Thus, the policy should have a small
or no impact on their likelihood to attend college. If the in-state tuition policy
has the same impact as on the college attendance of undocumented Mexicans, then
there are other unobserved factors that are correlated with the policy that affect all
foreign-born young adults, regardless of their legal status in the country. Using my
empirical strategy, I estimate the impact of the subsidy on the college enrollment of
immigrants in these two groups in order to establish their validity as control groups
for undocumented Mexican immigrants.
Additionally, I also estimate the effect of the policy on the native U.S. popu-
lation by considering the effect of in-state tuition on the following two groups: U.S.
citizens of Mexican parentage and U.S. born young adults. The in-state tuition sub-
sidy is not exclusive for the undocumented and states that adopt the in-state tuition
policy have to offer the same tuition rate to the U.S. citizens that satisfy the state
residency requirements. Thus, a reduction in the price of attendance might induce
more U.S. citizens to participate in higher education. On the other hand, as the op-
ponents of the in-state tuition for undocumented claim, the reduced tuition can have
a negative impact on natives since increased number of immigrants that compete
for a higher education will channel educational resources away from the native-born
students.
1.6 Results
Table 1.2 presents the college attendance rates of young adults during the 1997-
2001 period; a period when nearly all public universities did not provide subsidized
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education to the undocumented students.13 For the two age group in my analysis,
college attendance rates are presented for each sample considered, as well as for the
men and women in each sample. Those rates will serve as the benchmark in assessing
the impact of the policy on college enrollment for each group.
Before 2001, across all groups, non citizens have lower college participation
than U.S. citizens. This is true regardless of the age group considered. Compared to
the other non citizen groups, the group of Mexicans has a significantly lower college
attendance rate. Only 10 percent of the Mexican young adults between the ages
of 18 and 20 are enrolled in college. Compared to the Mexican group, the non-
Mexican Latino immigrants have significantly higher educational attainment, with 23
percent college attendance. On a similar note, for the older group, only 5 percent of
the Mexican adults are enrolled in college, while 23 percent of non-Mexican Latino
immigrants are attending college. Out of all the the samples constructed (including
both citizen and non-citizen samples) the non Latino group has the highest college
attendance rate for both young and older people in the sample. 44 percent of non
Latino young adults between the ages of 18 and 20 are enrolled in college and 45
percent of the older immigrants in this immigrant group attend college. Similar
discrepancies in college participation across groups persist after 2002 and most groups
show a small increase in college attendance after 2002. This is true for all immigrant
and age groups, except for the older non Mexican Latino immigrants for whom there
is a 2 percent decline in college enrollment after 2002.
Panel B of Table 1.2 shows that across all age and immigrant groups consid-
ered college participation rates are greater for women than men. Data also suggest
that irrespective of age or immigrant group considered women are more responsive
than men. For the non-citizen Mexican immigrants the introduction of the tuition
13New York is the only state that offered subsidized education during the period 1997-2001.
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subsidy increases the gender gap in college enrollment. 5 percent more women than
men attend college after in-state tuition is introduced. Irrespective of the age group
considered, among non-citizen Mexican immigrants 5 percent more women than men
are attending college. For the 18 to 20 year old population, among the non-Mexican
Latino immigrants, 11 percent more women than men are attending college represent-
ing a 1 percent increase in the gap prior to the introduction of subsidized education.
The price reduction, has a larger impact among the older non-Mexican Latino immi-
grants, and the gap between women and men increases from 2 percent to 11 percent
after the in-state tuition is offered. For the younger non-Latino immigrants the policy
does not have a different impact on the college enrollment of men and women while
it slightly increases the rate of enrollment among older women in this group. Among
the U.S. citizens considered, the college enrollment gender gap is slightly larger with
8 percent more women than men attending college before 2001.
Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 present the estimated impact of the policy on college
enrollment of young non-citizen Mexican adults for each specific age group; for the
18 to 20 years old adults and the 21 to 22 years old adults respectively. This basic
estimation does not control for tuition prices as its main purpose is to emphasize
the fact that the impact of the educational subsidy policy varies considerably across
states. This fact should be considered when making inferences about the main impact
of in-state tuition subsidy. Estimation of equation 1.1 without the control of tuition
prices and without allowing the policy effect to vary by age and across states, allows
me to estimate an aggregate impact of the in-state tuition subsidy on the college
enrollment decision.14 The effect is similar to Kaushal (2008). Irrespective of the age
group considered, the overall aggregate impact of the policy suggests that reduction
14Refer to the Notes section in Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 in order to get the value of aggregated
policy effect on college enrollment of young adults non-citizen Mexicans.
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in tuition charges results in a 2.1 percentage points increase in college participation
of undocumented Mexican immigrants. For the younger group, this represents a 21
percent increase over the mean base level of 10 percent college enrollment. On a
similar note, among the older population the overall aggregate impact of the policy
suggests that adopting the in-state tuition policy increases the likelihood of college by
42 percent (i.e. 2.1 percentage point increase over the mean base level of 5 percent).
Analyzing the impact by state, however, the policy effect seems to be driven
by a few states. This is true for both age groups considered. For the younger group,
the impact of the policy is considerably larger in California, Washington and Texas.
In contrast to this, the policy has a negative impact in Nebraska while for the older
group implementation of the policy in Nebraska results in a significant increase in the
likelihood of attending college. In order to better capture the variation in the impact
of the policy across states I include the tuition prices in my estimation. Tuition
prices vary over time and without controlling for this variation the estimated effect
represents an overall effect. If the existing variation is only driven by differences in
tuition prices, then my new state specific estimates should approximate the state
specific aggregate policy effect presented in Table 3 and Table 4. Otherwise, if tuition
does not pick the entire effect, then there are other factors that need to be considered.
Using the model described in equation (1.1), I first estimate the impact of
the subsidy when tuition prices control for resident and non resident tuition prices
charged by public 4-year universities and colleges. Then, using the same model, I
estimate the impact of the subsidy when tuition prices control instead for 2-year
public community college tuition prices. In both estimations, given the specification
of the model presented in equation (1.1), the effect for the main variable of interest,
the policy indicator variable, depends on the level of tuition charged either by public
universities or by community colleges for resident and non-resident students. For each
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age group considered in my analysis, using the mean level of tuition, point estimates
for the in-state tuition subsidy for undocumented Mexican students are presented in
Table 1.5. Panel A presents the point estimates when I use 4-year public university
prices while Panel B presents the point estimates when I control for tuition prices
at public community colleges. Differences between men and women with respect to
their likelihood of attending college are also presented in this table.
For the overall undocumented Mexican population in the sample, the estimates
suggest the policy is associated with a 1.5 percentage points increase in college enroll-
ment among the young adults aged 18 to 20 years old. The effect is not statistically
significant and represents a 15 percent increase in enrollment over the base level of 10
percent (refer to Table 2). Compared to the younger group, the older Mexican adults
are more responsive and in-state tuition subsidy increases the likelihood of attending
college among these adults by 5.9 percentage points. This effect is statistically sig-
nificant. Adopting the in-state tuition will double the proportion of undocumented
students aged 21 and 22 who attend college.
In Panel B of Table 1.5 tuition prices control for 2-year public community
college fees. Average community college attendance prices are smaller than public
university prices. This difference makes community colleges a more accessible option
for getting a higher education and the policy has a larger effect. This is true for stu-
dents from very low income families that cannot substitute into 4-year public schools
when in-state tuition is offered. Enrollment decision for community college is also a
more spontaneous decision and thus the policy has a more immediate and smaller im-
pact on the likelihood of attending college. Among the younger adults, the estimated
effect of the in-state tuition subsidy is slightly smaller compared to the effect obtained
by using public universities prices. Offering in-state tuition benefits to undocumented
immigrants in the younger group results in a 0.9 percentage points increase in their
22
college attendance. The effect is small and not statistically significant. For the older
population, adopting the in-state tuition policy has a larger impact when community
college prices are used. Among those aged 21 and 22 years old, the in-state tuition
policy increases their probability of attending college by 6.9 percentage points (or 138
percent increase over the mean base level).
The current analysis also estimates separately the effect of the policy for men
and women in order to assess whether the policy will create different incentives be-
tween men and women and thus contribute at the existing gender gap. Table 1.5
contains the estimated effects for non-citizen Mexican men and women in each age
group. In brief, irrespective of age, price reduction in tuition broadens the college
attendance gap between men and women as more men than women are attending
colleges when the policy is implemented. Additionally, older men are more likely to
attend college when the subsidy is offered.
For the younger Mexican immigrants, the in-state tuition subsidy has a sig-
nificantly much larger impact on men than women. This is true for both public
university prices and community college prices. The likelihood of attending college
for the undocumented Mexican men in this age group, increases by 7.7 percentage
points when the policy is implemented. This represents a 86 percent increase over
the average level of college participation (i.e. 9% reported in Table 1.2, Panel B).
For undocumented Mexican women in this age group, offering in-state tuition results
in a 8.6 percentage points decline in their probability of attending college. The large
magnitude of this effect, represents a 72 percent decline over the average level of
college participation for women in this group.
In contrast to the younger Mexican immigrants, the in-state tuition subsidy
has a larger impact on college attendance among the older immigrants. Adopting
subsidized education will more than double the proportion of undocumented Mexican
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men older than 21 that are attending college (i.e. 10.2 percentage point increase over
the mean base level of 4 percent). Compared to the younger Mexican women, the
older women are positively affected by the subsidized tuition. Adopting the policy
results in a 1.2 percentage points increase in their probability of attending college.
The effect is not statistically significant.
The findings mentioned above suggest that the gap between men and women
is actually getting smaller, and it is significantly becoming smaller for younger immi-
grants. Those estimates, however, are puzzling since the analysis provided in Table
1.2 shows that the gap between Mexican men and women became larger after states
adopted subsidized education. Thus, I conclude that offering in-state tuition could
decrease the gender gap between men and women.
According to the data, non-citizen Mexicans in both age groups are more
likely to be married. This provides one possible explanation for the occurring changes
between men and women in response to subsidized education. Men are more likely
to take advantage of the price reduction and attend college in order to increase the
standard of living for their families while women will enter the labor market in order
to support them.
Analysis in table 1.6 presents the impact of the policy among married and
single adults. Irrespective of age, single men are more likely to take advantage of the
policy and attend college than married men. College attendance of married young
men increases by 7.6 percentage points while attendance among single men adults
increases by 8.2 percentage points. Similarly, college attendance among older men is
2.2 percentage points larger for single men than married men. Women, in general,
are dropping out of college in response to tuition policy. Married women are more
likely to leave college when the in-state tuition is offered. College attendance among
married women between the ages of 18 and 20 years old is dropping at a rate of 9.2
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percentage points, a rate that is 2.6 percentage points larger than the dropping rate of
single women in this age group. Among older women, college participation of married
women declines by 7.2 percentage points when in-state tuition is offered.
Given the great variation in tuition prices that is present among the states,
Table 1.7 and Table 1.8 highlight the estimated impact of in-state tuition subsidy
across different states. Table 1.7 presents the estimated effect of in-state tuition when
I control for public university tuition prices, while Table 1.8 presents the estimated
impact of subsidized education when I control for resident and non-resident prices
charged by community colleges. Each table presents the estimated impact on non-
citizen Mexicans, by age group and sex, in the ten states have already implemented
in-state tuition policies for undocumented immigrants by 2008. I also examine the
predicted effects in two states that recently have proposed legislative bills that would
allow undocumented students to pay resident tuition, as well as in two states that
have passed legislation that ban public universities and community colleges from
offering in-state tuition to undocumented students. In brief, it should be noted that
irrespective of age or tuition used to compute the estimated effect, in almost all states
considered, men are more likely than women to respond to the in-state tuition subsidy.
Also older men are more likely to take advantage of the subsidy when this is offered.
For the younger immigrant group, the in-state tuition subsidy has the greatest
impact on college participation in California, Texas and Washington. In California,
allowing undocumented young Mexicans to pay resident tuition results in a 5.2 per-
centage points increase in college enrollment over the base level of 11.8 (or 44 percent
increase). A similar but larger effect is present when I use community college prices to
compute the estimated impact of the policy. For the older immigrants in California,
the impact of the subsidy is smaller. Subsidized education in this state results in a 2.5
percentage point increase in the college attendance of older immigrants, representing
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a 48 percent increase over the mean base level of 5.2 percent. This estimated effect,
however, is not statistically significant. Controlling for community college prices re-
sults in a much smaller and not statistically significant impact on college enrollment
of older undocumented Mexicans.
On a similar note, adopting the in-state tuition subsidy in the state of Texas
results in a 29 percent increase in the proportion of young undocumented Mexicans
that attend college (from 10.8 percent to 13.9 percent). The impact of the subsidy is
significantly larger for older immigrants in Texas and allowing undocumented Mex-
icans in this age group to pay in-state tuition increases the proportion that attends
college by 76 percent (from 7.2 percent to 12.5 percent). Similar effects, but larger, as
those in Texas are present in Washington state. Undocumented Mexicans aged 18 to
20 years old in Oklahoma and Nebraska, however, are dropping out of college when
the in-state tuition subsidy is introduced. These results are mostly driven by women.
Older immigrants in those states are positively affected by the subsidized education.
Subsidized education has a positive effect on both men and women in the
state of California. Women are more likely than men to attend college when the
resident tuition price is offered. This is true regardless of the age group considered and
regardless of whether estimation controls for university prices or community colleges
prices. In contrast to California, the younger undocumented Mexican men in Texas
and Washington are more likely than women to take advantage of the tuition subsidy.
In those states, younger men are more likely to be affected by the policy (e.g. 6.9 and
7.4 percentage points increase among those aged 18 to 20 years old compared to 6.4
and 5.6 percentage points increase among the older men). For the older immigrants, in
Texas, similar results are present. Allowing undocumented Mexicans to pay in-state
tuition in Texas results in 6.4 percentage point increase in the college attendance of
men and 4.5 percentage point increase in the college attendance of women. Compared
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to Texas, older women in Washington are more responsive and their college enrollment
increases by 2 percentage points more than the college enrollment of men in the same
age group.
During the last several years, Florida and New Jersey have proposed legislative
bills to offer in-state tuition for undocumented immigrants. Florida and New Jersey
have the third and the fifth highest concentration of illegal immigrants.15 Using the
estimated effect of the policy, I compute the impact that approval of the legislation
could have on the undocumented immigrants in those two states. For the state
of Florida, offering in-state tuition can result in a significant 6 percentage points
increase in the likelihood of attending college among those aged 18 to 20 years old.
Using the mean base level of 5.5 percent, adopting the in-state tuition will double the
proportion of undocumented students that attend college. High nonresident tuition
prices and low resident fees, thus resulting in a significant subsidy when the policy
is implemented, explain what drives this major effect. For the older immigrants in
Florida, the subsidy has a much smaller impact. The effect is significantly smaller if
I use the community college tuition prices to compute the estimated impact of the
in-state tuition. Regardless of the age group considered, when controlling for 4-year
university tuition prices undocumented women in Florida are more likely than men
to attend college if subsidized education were offered (i.e. 6.4 and 10.4 percentage
points increase for young and older women compared to 4.6 and -1.7 percentage
point increase for men). The reverse if true when I control for community college
prices and men become more likely to respond to in-state tuition subsidy. Using
the same approach, allowing illegal Mexican students to pay in-state tuition in New
Jersey has a small and statistically insignificant impact on college attendance of young
15In 2008, 8% of the entire illegal immigration lived in Florida while 5% of illegal aliens reside in
New Jersey. (Passel and Cohn, 2009)
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immigrants. For the older immigrants, however, the college enrollment will go up by
11.1 percentage points if in-state tuition is offered to undocumented immigrants. In
contrast to Florida, both younger and older men are more likely to be affected by the
subsidy and increase their college attendance, while women are actually dropping out
if subsidy were to be offered. This is true regardless of the type of prices I control
for.
Since 2006, Colorado and Arizona have passed legislation that ban public uni-
versities and community colleges from offering in-state tuition to illegal immigrants.
In Arizona, for instance, since the passage of legislation that requires undocumented
immigrants to pay non-resident tuition fees, 1,500 students from Arizona State Uni-
versity and the University of Arizona and nearly 1,800 community college students
have been denied financial aid or in-state tuition status. (Russell, 2007). Using the
estimated impact of offering in-state tuition to undocumented students, I calculate
the impact of removing the ban and allowing undocumented students to pay resident
tuition in those two states. In Arizona, irrespective of age group considered, removing
the ban and allowing undocumented students to pay in-state tuition could result in a
4.6 percentage points increase in the college attendance. This represents a 49 percent
increase in college attendance of undocumented Mexicans aged 18 to 20 years old over
the mean base level of 9.25 percent, and a 65 percent increase over the mean base
level of 7.1 percent for the older immigrants. For the state of Colorado, there is no
significant impact of the policy on the college enrollment of younger undocumented
immigrants. For the older immigrants in the state of Colorado, removing the ban
would more than triple the college attendance of the adults in this age group. In
both states considered, for the younger group, men are more likely than women to
change their college attendance in response to in-state tuition. On the other hand, in
the older group, women are significantly more likely to be affected by in-state tuition
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subsidy.
1.6.1 Additional Tests
The effect of the policy is also estimated on two additional groups of non-
citizens who are less likely to be undocumented: non-Mexican Latino immigrants
and non-Latino immigrants. This analysis is conducted in order to establish the
validity of these control groups when my empirical approach is implemented. These
samples are also restricted to immigrants who arrived after the year 1987 and that
have lived in the country long enough to satisfy the residency requirements for in-
state tuition. Estimated effects for the policy effect for all these groups are presented
in Table 1.9.
According to Table 1.9, estimated coefficients for the non-Mexican Latino im-
migrants suggest that in-state tuition policy has no significant impact on the college
attendance of adults in this group. This is true, irrespective of age group, sex or
tuition considered. Similar to Kaushal (2008), this group constitutes a valid control
group as these immigrants are less likely to be impacted by the policy and thus their
decision of college enrollment should be independent of whether in-state tuition is
offered to undocumented immigrants or not.
Table 1.9 also presents the estimated effects of tuition subsidy on the college
enrollment of non-Latino immigrants. For the immigrants in the non-Latino group,
the policy has a negative impact on their college attendance, and older immigrants
are more likely than younger immigrants to drop out when the in-state tuition is
offered. Younger women in this group this group are also more likely than Mexican
women to respond to the subsidy. There is a 22.4 percentage points decline in college
enrollment among non-Latino young women when the policy is implemented, repre-
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senting a 51 percent decline over the mean base level of 46 percent. Younger men
are positively impacted by the policy, but the effect is not statistically significant.
On the other hand, the policy results in college dropping among the older men in
this immigrant group. Similar results are present when community college prices are
used. These results suggest that given my empirical approach (i.e. allowing for dif-
ferential effects across age groups and directly controlling for tuition) the non-Latino
immigrant group, perhaps, does not constitute a valid group.
Next, I estimate the impact of subsidized in-state tuition policy on the college
enrollment of U.S. citizens. This analysis provides evidence of whether or not in-
creased competition from subsidized education crowds out college attendance of U.S.
citizens. Estimated effect of the policy on U.S. born young adults and on U.S. citizens
of Mexican parentage are presented in Table 1.10. Those results provide significant
evidence that offering subsidized education to undocumented immigrants does not
harm the educational opportunities of U.S. citizens and it might actually results in
greater college enrollment for some of them.
Allowing undocumented immigrants to pay in-state tuition does not have any
impact on the college enrollment of the overall U.S. born citizens. Irrespective of
the age group considered, the effect is trivial and not statistically significant when
estimation uses tuition charged by 4 year public universities. Using community college
prices, there is some evidence that the policy has a negative impact on the college
enrollment of U.S. citizens. For the younger age group, the policy results in a 1.4
percentage point decline in enrollment. Women in this group are slightly less likely to
drop out of college than men. Those results could possibly be explained by the fact
that students switch from community colleges into public universities that become
more affordable as the in-state tuition is offered to undocumented immigrants. For the
older age group, offering in-state tuition has a positive small impact and is statistically
30
significant only for the overall effect.
Families with mixed immigration status are common among the Mexican fam-
ilies in the U.S. Young adults that are U.S. citizens with Mexican parents are very
likely to have undocumented siblings or family members. Thus, the in-state tuition
policy, by lowering the cost of attendance for an undocumented sibling, indirectly
makes higher education more affordable for a young adult in families with mixed im-
migration status. For the young adults in this group, irrespective of the prices used,
younger adults are more likely then older people to take advantage of the tuition
subsidy. The policy results in a 10.3 percentage points (or 39.6 percent) increase in
the overall proportion of young people that are attending college. The estimated ef-
fect for younger women is consistent with the previous literature and younger women
are more likely than men to attend college when in-state tuition is offered. College
attendance goes up by 12.6 percentage points (or 42 percent) for younger women,
while college participation for men increases by a smaller 8.2 percentage points (or 37
percent). The estimated effects increases when I use community college prices. For
the older adults, those aged 21 to 22 years old, the policy has no significant effect on
their decision to enroll in higher education.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper provides a detailed analysis of the effect of in-state tuition for un-
documented students on the college enrollment of Mexican young adults. Compared
to the previous research, this analysis highlights the effect of the subsidy for specific
age groups and for each state. The older undocumented immigrants, although more
likely to be out of high school for a while, are more likely to take advantage of the
subsidy. The estimated impact for this group is twice as large as the overall effect
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reported by Kaushal (2008). Additionally, given that the impact of the subsidy varies
across states, by directly controlling for tuition I can explain part of the variation that
arises across states.
According to the estimation results, the presence of subsidized education re-
sults in a 1.5 percentage points increase in college enrollment among the younger
adults in the Mexican group. Although the effect is not statistically significant, the
effect of the policy is relatively large and represents a 15 percent increase in enroll-
ment over the base enrollment level of 11 percent. A much larger and statistically
significant effect is present for the older undocumented Mexican adults. College en-
rollment among the older Mexican immigrants will double with the introduction of
in-state tuition policy. Irrespective of age, the subsidy is more likely to increase the
likelihood of college attendance for men than for women. The likelihood of attend-
ing college for the younger undocumented Mexican men increases by 7.7 percentage
points (or 86 percent) while adopting the policy will more than triple the proportion
of older undocumented Mexican immigrants that attend college. For the younger
women, the policy reduces their college enrollment by 8.6 percentage points, repre-
senting a significant 72 percent decline over the average level of college participation
for women in this group. There is no significant impact on the college enrollment of
older undocumented Mexican women (i.e. women aged 21 and 22 years old).
The analysis of gender differences suggests that men are more responsive to
the subsidy than women. Current analysis also finds that marital status does create
different incentives among men and women when college enrollment becomes more
affordable. Both married and single men are enrolling in college when the attendance
price is reduced. Married men, however, compared to single men are less responsive.
On the other hand, married women are more likely to drop out of college. Given
the positive response for married men, this result might suggest that women are
32
more likely to drop out of college and join the labor market in order to take care of
household and increase the potential of future earnings in the household.
Additional analysis performed shows that the policy does not affect only non-
citizen Mexicans. The college enrollment of the immigrants in these additional groups
are significantly affected by the subsidized education for the undocumented students.
Thus, the control groups used in previous research in order to validate the estimated
effects of the policy on the college enrollment of undocumented immigrants are, per-
haps, not the best groups that can validate the results of a more detailed analysis on
the impact of the policy.
The study also shows that the subsidized education has a positive effect on
the educational attainment of a small share of U.S. citizens (i.e. U.S. citizen with
Mexican parents). This positive effect can be explained by the fact that those adults
are likely to belong to families with mixed immigration status. Thus, the policy
is likely to indirectly reduce the cost of attending college for citizens with Mexican
parentage by lowering attendance cost for undocumented siblings or family members.
The main implication of this study is that in-state tuition subsidies encourage
college attendance among non-citizen Mexican immigrants while at the same time
in-state tuition for undocumented immigrants does not appear to crowd out college
attendance of U.S. citizens. If the main purpose of the policy is to improve the
educational opportunities of illegal immigrants, then legislators in the other states
could support similar policies. Whether the potential benefits of a more educated un-
documented immigrant population, such as increased tax contributions generated by
higher lifetime earnings, exceed the costs of accommodating the illegal immigrants in
the educational system, such as the estimated cost of providing subsidized education,
is cause for future research.
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Table 1.3: Effect of In-State Tuition Subsidy by Age and State in States that Offer
In-State Tuition for 18-20 Years Old Non-Citizen Mexican Immigrants
Policy Effects Policy Effects Policy Effects
by Age Group by State by State and Age
Age 18 0.011 (0.015) California 0.034** (0.016) California
Age 19 0.015 (0.015) Illinois 0.003 (0.029) Age 18 0.025 (0.018)
Age 20 0.034** (0.014) Kansas -0.119*** (0.044) Age 19 0.028 (0.019)
Nebraska -0.120** (0.047) Age 20 0.049*** (0.017)
New Mexico -0.061 (0.042) Illinois
New York 0.075** (0.033) Age 18 -0.008 (0.030)
Oklahoma -0.003 (0.035) Age 19 -0.005 (0.031)
Texas 0.046** (0.020) Age 20 0.015 (0.030)
Utah 0.002 (0.026) Kansas
Washington 0.107*** (0.039) Age 18 -0.125*** (0.044)
Age 19 -0.123*** (0.045)
Age 20 -0.102** (0.045)
Nebraska
Age 18 -0.130*** (0.048)
Age 19 -0.128*** (0.049)
Age 20 -0.107** (0.048)
New Mexico
Age 18 -0.072* (0.043)
Age 19 -0.069 (0.043)
Age 20 -0.048 (0.042)
New York
Age 18 0.068** (0.034)
Age 19 0.070** (0.034)
Age 20 0.091*** (0.034)
Oklahoma
Age 18 -0.014 (0.037)
Age 19 -0.011 (0.037)
Age 20 0.010 (0.036)
Texas
Age 18 0.037* (0.021)
Age 19 0.039* (0.022)
Age 20 0.060*** (0.022)
Utah
Age 18 -0.009 (0.028)
Age 19 -0.006 (0.028)
Age 20 0.015 (0.027)
Washington
Age 18 0.097** (0.039)
Age 19 0.099** (0.040)
Age 20 0.120*** (0.040)
Notes: Policy becomes effective one year after enactment date. The sample of analysis is restricted to non-citizen
Mexicans young adults who entered the U.S. after 1987. Estimation controls for age, gender, marital status, race,
month of the year, state and year fixed effects, monthly state unemployment rate and the proportion of the
non-Hispanic White population with at least some college education. Robust and clustered standard errors in
parentheses. The aggregate impact of the policy is 0.021 and is statistically significant at 10 percent. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 1.4: Effect of In-State Tuition Subsidy by Age and State in States that Offer
In-State Tuition for 21-22 Years Old Non-Citizen Mexican Immigrants
Policy Effects Policy Effects Policy Effects
by Age Group by State by State and Age
Age 21 0.026** (0.012) California 0.017 (0.013) California
Age 22 0.016 (0.010) Illinois 0.039* (0.023) Age 21 0.022 (0.014)
Kansas -0.134*** (0.045) Age 22 0.013 (0.013)
Nebraska 0.072 (0.065) Illinois
New Mexico 0.005 (0.039) Age 21 0.044* (0.024)
New York 0.032 (0.021) Age 22 0.035 (0.023)
Oklahoma 0.103** (0.049) Kansas
Texas 0.005 (0.017) Age 21 -0.129*** (0.046)
Utah 0.046** (0.021) Age 22 -0.139*** (0.045)
Washington 0.048** (0.021) Nebraska
Age 21 0.078 (0.066)
Age 22 0.069 (0.065)
New Mexico
Age 21 0.011 (0.039)
Age 22 0.002 (0.039)
New York
Age 21 0.038* (0.022)
Age 22 0.029 (0.022)
Oklahoma
Age 21 0.107** (0.049)
Age 22 0.098** (0.050)
Texas
Age 21 0.010 (0.018)
Age 22 0.001 (0.017)
Utah
Age 21 0.051** (0.022)
Age 22 0.042* (0.022)
Washington
Age 21 0.053** (0.022)
Age 22 0.044** (0.022)
Notes: Policy becomes effective one year after enactment date. The sample of analysis is restricted to non-citizen
Mexicans young adults who entered the U.S. after 1987. Estimation controls for age, gender, marital status, race,
month of the year, state and year fixed effects, monthly state unemployment rate and the proportion of the
non-Hispanic White population with at least some college education. Robust and clustered standard errors in
parentheses. The aggregate impact of the policy is 0.021 and is statistically significant at 5 percent. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 1.7: Estimated Effect of In-State Tuition on College Enrollment of Non-Citizen
Mexican Immigrants by State (use Public University Prices)
Age 18-20 Age 21-22
Overall Men Women Overall Men Women
Policy (mean of ln(Tuition)) 0.015 0.077*** -0.086** 0.059*** 0.102*** 0.012
(0.020) (0.025) (0.035) (0.016) (0.024) (0.027)
States that Adopted Policy by 2008
California 0.052** 0.035 0.066* 0.025 -0.035 0.093**
(0.025) (0.032) (0.038) (0.020) (0.022) (0.037)
Illinois 0.007 0.106*** -0.150*** 0.085*** 0.175*** -0.011
(0.029) (0.035) (0.051) (0.024) (0.033) (0.039)
Kansas -0.004 0.044* -0.076** 0.022 0.048* -0.014
(0.020) (0.026) (0.033) (0.017) (0.027) (0.029)
Nebraska -0.096* 0.050 -0.296*** 0.008 0.165** -0.189**
(0.052) (0.064) (0.089) (0.049) (0.080) (0.082)
New Mexico -0.011 0.016 -0.050 -0.007 -0.005 -0.021
(0.026) (0.032) (0.042) (0.022) (0.032) (0.039)
New York 0.010 0.099*** -0.132*** 0.079*** 0.156*** -0.004
(0.027) (0.032) (0.046) (0.022) (0.031) (0.035)
Oklahoma -0.084* 0.020 -0.222*** -0.019 0.085 -0.157**
(0.048) (0.059) (0.082) (0.045) (0.073) (0.076)
Texas 0.031 0.069*** -0.035 0.054*** 0.064*** 0.045*
(0.019) (0.024) (0.032) (0.015) (0.019) (0.026)
Utah -0.030 0.029 -0.114** 0.002 0.045 -0.060
(0.029) (0.035) (0.047) (0.026) (0.041) (0.044)
Washington 0.049** 0.074** -0.003 0.062*** 0.056** 0.076**
(0.023) (0.029) (0.039) (0.019) (0.023) (0.032)
States that Proposed Policy but not yet Implemented
Florida 0.060** 0.046 0.064 0.038* -0.017 0.104***
(0.025) (0.032) (0.040) (0.021) (0.025) (0.038)
New Jersey -0.002 0.134*** -0.213*** 0.111*** 0.247*** -0.034
(0.040) (0.048) (0.069) (0.032) (0.044) (0.054)
States that Ban Policy*
Arizona 0.046** 0.058** 0.015 0.046*** 0.024 0.075**
(0.021) (0.027) (0.034) (0.017) (0.020) (0.030)
Colorado 0.020 0.044* -0.023 0.027* 0.022 0.030
(0.018) (0.023) (0.028) (0.014) (0.018) (0.025)
Notes: The sample of analysis is restricted to non-citizen Mexicans young adults who entered the U.S. after 1987.
Estimation controls for age, gender, marital status, race, month of the year, state and year fixed effects, monthly
state unemployment rate and the proportion of the non-Hispanic White population with at least some college
education, the proportion of Mexican adults 30 to 54 years old with at least a high school degree and resident and
non-resident tuition prices. Estimated impact of the in-state tuition policy by state is computed as:
α3*IST+α4*OST+α5 where IST and OST represent the state average resident and non-resident undergraduate
tuition fees for each state. Refer to Appendix C, Table C.1 for the values of average prices used. Robust and
clustered standard errors in parentheses. * Refers to what would happen in those states if the ban of in-state tuition
were removed. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 1.8: Estimated Effect of In-State Tuition on College Enrollment of Non-Citizen
Mexican Immigrants by State (use Public Community College Prices)
Age 18-20 Age 21-22
Overall Men Women Overall Men Women
Policy (mean of ln(Tuition)) 0.009 0.056** -0.042 0.069*** 0.117*** 0.008
(0.023) (0.027) (0.039) (0.017) (0.026) (0.027)
States that Adopted Policy by 2008
California 0.072*** 0.063** 0.071* 0.004 -0.037* 0.045
(0.025) (0.031) (0.039) (0.020) (0.020) (0.037)
Illinois 0.057* 0.077** 0.027 0.065*** 0.107*** 0.007
(0.029) (0.035) (0.052) (0.023) (0.033) (0.034)
Kansas -0.046* 0.028 -0.122*** 0.068*** 0.116*** 0.013
(0.025) (0.034) (0.038) (0.021) (0.030) (0.036)
Nebraska -0.079** 0.013 -0.170*** 0.071*** 0.121*** 0.014
(0.032) (0.044) (0.047) (0.027) (0.038) (0.048)
New Mexico -0.043 0.019 -0.106** 0.038 0.043 0.032
(0.029) (0.040) (0.041) (0.024) (0.032) (0.042)
New York -0.011 0.054 -0.081 0.094*** 0.176*** -0.006
(0.031) (0.038) (0.053) (0.024) (0.036) (0.038)
Oklahoma -0.010 0.046* -0.070** 0.069*** 0.116*** 0.010
(0.021) (0.027) (0.036) (0.017) (0.025) (0.027)
Texas -0.041* 0.026 -0.110*** 0.055*** 0.085*** 0.021
(0.024) (0.034) (0.036) (0.020) (0.028) (0.036)
Utah 0.025 0.063** -0.018 0.067*** 0.114*** 0.008
(0.024) (0.029) (0.042) (0.019) (0.027) (0.028)
Washington 0.032 0.068** -0.011 0.073*** 0.127*** 0.004
(0.028) (0.033) (0.049) (0.021) (0.031) (0.032)
States that Proposed Policy but not yet Implemented
Florida 0.027 0.062** -0.014 0.063*** 0.104*** 0.011
(0.023) (0.027) (0.040) (0.017) (0.026) (0.026)
New Jersey -0.007 0.054 -0.072 0.088*** 0.163*** -0.003
(0.029) (0.035) (0.050) (0.022) (0.033) (0.035)
States that Ban Policy*
Arizona 0.045** 0.064*** 0.017 0.045*** 0.061*** 0.021
(0.020) (0.024) (0.035) (0.016) (0.021) (0.025)
Colorado 0.046 0.075** 0.009 0.074*** 0.129*** 0.002
(0.031) (0.037) (0.055) (0.024) (0.035) (0.036)
Notes: The sample of analysis is restricted to non-citizen Mexicans young adults who entered the U.S. after 1987.
Estimation controls for age, gender, marital status, race, month of the year, state and year fixed effects, monthly
state unemployment rate and the proportion of the non-Hispanic White population with at least some college
education, the proportion of Mexican adults 30 to 54 years old with at least a high school degree and resident and
non-resident tuition prices. Estimated impact of the in-state tuition policy by state is computed as:
α3*IST+α4*OST+α5 where IST and OST represent the state average resident and non-resident undergraduate
tuition fees for each state. Refer to Appendix C, Table C.1 for the values of average prices used. Robust and
clustered standard errors in parentheses. * Refers to what would happen in those states if the ban of in-state tuition
were removed. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Chapter 2
Love in the Time of Taxation
2.1 Introduction
Over the past four decades the defining characteristics of the typical American
family have changed considerably. Marriage rates are declining rates while divorce
and cohabitation rates are increasing. The divorce rate in the United States began
rising during the 1960s and reached the highest peak during the late ’70s and early
’80s when changes in divorce related legislation were adopted by most states. Since
then, the national per capita divorce rate has declined steadily. According to National
Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), in 2007 the annual divorce rate has reached 3.6
divorces for every 1000 people. At the same time, the marriage rate has been steadily
decreasing while cohabitation has been increasing during this period.
These changes in the American family dynamics have attracted many scholars
in examining the determinants of those changing trends away from marriage. The ma-
jority of empirical studies rely on demographic, economic, and socio-cultural factors
in explaining those changes in the family life. Age and racial distributions, female-to-
male ratios, fertility rates, male and female potential earnings, gender roles, as well
44
as acceptability of divorce constitute only a few of the most used determinants in
explaining the marriage termination decision.
The role of government’s actions on the changing family trends also attracted
scholars’ attention. Most of the current literature consists of studies that analyze
how households’ behavioral decisions are affected by governmental policies and spe-
cific welfare programs. Recent studies concentrate on the effect of Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC), Social Security, the income tax code, as well as child support en-
forcement on individuals’ incentives to marry or to leave the marriage. The existing
welfare programs, such as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) are be-
lieved to reduce the cost of leaving the family since the government pays a part of the
tab. Previous empirical studies find that welfare assistance programs, such as AFDC,
offer great incentives for marriage delays. They increase the marriage termination
rates and the percentage of single parent families, as well as encourage cohabitation
and out-of-wedlock births.1
Building on the previous studies, this paper supplements the existing literature
by providing an empirical analysis of the effect of tax treatment of married couples
and single individuals on the timing of divorce decision. Given the structure of the tax
system in which the family’s yearly tax liability is computed based on the family’s
status as of the last day of the tax year, couples might have different incentives
regarding the decision of when to terminate their marriage. Variation in incentives
regarding the divorce timing depends on the distribution of earnings between the
partners. Thus, for a given level of earnings the tax liability will have different effects
on various types of families. For instance, couples in which partner’s earnings are
similar will face a greater penalty from staying married and filing the joint taxes than
1Moffitt (1992) literature review on the incentive effects created by the welfare system in the U.S
provides a great detailed description of the different incentives that result from the governmental
programs.
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couples in which the earnings discrepancy between partners is significant. If both
spouses earn about the same amount of money, then they end up in a higher tax
bracket and face higher taxes if they file as married. To the extent that differences in
tax liability are significant, the couple’s behavior might adjust in order to offset the
marriage penalty associated with a later divorce (i.e. a divorce that takes place at the
beginning of a new tax year). In short, the paper analyzes whether the tax burden of
being married versus being single affects behavior by having an effect on the timing
of divorce and by creating incentives for accelerating the marriage termination by end
of the year. While the so-called marriage penalty was eliminated in 2003, this paper
analyzes the impact of the penalty by stressing the fact that this type of policy can
affect the timing of divorce.2 This reinforces the conclusions of other researchers that
family choices are driven by government policy.
2.2 Literature Review
The previous empirical literature on marriage instability and disruption is vast
and ranges from the effect of financial expectations and surprises on marital stability
to the behavioral responses, as well as timing of decisions, to taxes and potential
welfare benefits. For instance, Weiss and Willis (1997) find that financial surprises
(i.e. changes in the predicted earning capacity of either spouse) have a negative
effect on the divorce hazard. According to their results, an unexpected increase in
husband’s earning capacity reduces the likelihood of marriage termination.
Building on previous theoretical models in which an increase in the expected
transfers will increase the probability of divorce, empirical studies conducted by Hoff-
2The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 eliminated the impact of the mar-
riage penalty by equalizing the standard deduction for singles and married couples and increasing
the end point of the 15 percent tax bracket for married couples filing jointly.
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man and Duncan (1995), as well as Moffitt (1992) find that conditional governmental
welfare programs do increase the likelihood of marriage termination and the formation
of the female headed households. However, even though both studies find significant
results, the authors conclude that the magnitude of the welfare programs is really
small and cannot explain the changing trends in the typical American family (i.e. the
falling marriage rates and the increasing number of female headed households).
The tax system in the United States where the household constitutes the unit
of taxation gives rise to the marriage penalty. The marriage penalty implies that
married couples have a lower after tax income when married than when they are two
single individuals. Based on previous literature, marriage penalty deters couples from
getting married and encourages couples to cohabit and delay their marriage decision.3
On this note, in their empirical study, Sjoquist and Walker (1995) find that as the
potential marriage penalty increases there are fewer couples who marry at the end of
the year relative to the beginning months of the next year.4
Similar to Sjoquist and Walker, Whittington and Alm (1996) find that there
exists a positive relationship between the probability of delaying marriage from the
last quarter of one year to the first quarter of the next year and the potential marriage
penalty faced by the couple if they marry in the current tax year. Although the effect
is small, the couple decides when to marry based on the comparison of the tax burden
of being married versus being single. For an average marriage penalty of $300 in 1985,
the estimated effect of income tax decreased the likelihood of marriage by 2% in 1985.
Additionally, the authors also find that in the presence of a marriage penalty, nearly
5% of couples decided to delay the marriage. Using the total number of marriages as
3Cohabitation is likely to arise as undeclared cohabitation is difficult to be proved.
4Note that the tax year starts on January 1st and ends on December 31st. Thus, couples that do
marry before the end of the year need to file their taxes as either ”married filing jointly” or ”married
filing separately.” However, there is no advantage for filing separately.
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a base level, at an average of 2.5 million marriages each year the income tax led to a
delay of 50,000 marriages.
In a later empirical study, Whittington and Alm (1997), using data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) find that couples do indeed respond to tax
incentives in their decision to divorce and conclude that federal individual income
taxes play some role in divorce decisions of men and women. Even though the esti-
mated effect of taxes is small the authors find that women are more likely than men
to terminate the marriage given that married women in their sample face higher taxes
than unmarried women. This result is plausible since joint filing imposes a higher tax
on the secondary earner. Similarly, Clarke and Strauss (1996) find that the marriage
taxes have a greater impact on marriage termination than on marriage formation.
Compared to the previous mentioned papers, the current study uses a different
methodical approach in estimating the impact of the marriage tax penalty on the
divorce decision. This paper estimates the impact of tax incentives on the timing
decision of divorce, specifically in the choice between divorce in the last quarter of
the year versus the first quarter of the next. The estimation period, 1980-1996,
represents a time in which the family structure and women decisions of entering the
labor market were significantly affected by different tax reforms that occurred during
the considered 1980-2004 time span.5 With more married women entering the labor
market, the family’s earnings distribution is altered and the earnings discrepancy
among partners is reduced. Thus, to the extent that the different tax treatment of
married couples versus single individuals has a significant effect on the likelihood of
divorce and the timing decision, the current paper aims to quantify a more significant
effect of the tax liability on this type of behavioral decisions.
5Eissa (1995) finds that the introduction of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 resulted in a 19 percent
increase in the labor force participation by top income married women.
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2.3 Theoretical Framework
In the classical framework of marriage formation developed by Becker (1991),
marriage occurs as a partnership of joint production and consumption in which the
couple maximizes the benefits from both market and non-market (children and com-
panionship) activities. In this framework, the higher the value of marriage, the less
likely it is that the marriage will dissolve and investments in the relationship provide
a greater marriage value. On the other hand, when the value of marriage falls below
the sum of the husband’s and wife’s outside opportunities, the marriage is going to
terminate. In other words, a couple will terminate their marriage when the share
of commodities produced in the household is less than the share produced by each
person if single (i.e. Zm ≡ Zmm + Zmf ≤ Zsm + Zsf ).
For the married couple, the household production of commodities, Zm, is
a function of time spent in housework by each spouse, Hm and Hf , and market
goods, X (i.e. Z = Z(Hm, Hf , X)). Each spouse is present in the labor market and
faces a personal time constraint. Lm and Lf represent the amount of time spend in
employment and T represents the total time endowment. For each spouse: Li+Hi = T
for i = m, f .
The optimum amount of household consumption must be consistent with the
following budget constraint:
P ∗X = T ∗ wm ∗ (T −Hm) + wf ∗ (T −Hf ). (2.1)
For simplicity I assume a fixed proportion functional form for the household produc-
tion of commodities: Zm = min
{
X
a
,
Hf
bf
, Hm
bm
}
. Thus, the demand for inputs is given
by X = aZ , Hm = bmZ
m, and Hf = bfZ
m where a represents the amount of market
good necessary to produce one unit of the married household good Zm, and bm and
bf represent the time share spend in housework by each spouse. Given this functional
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form the optimum amount of Z for the married couple is given by:
Zm =
T ∗ (wm + wf )
P ∗ a+ wfbf + wmbm
. (2.2)
The numerator represents the total income of the couple, while the denom-
inator incorporates the total price of the Z commodity: the market price given by
aP and the time, or opportunity cost given by wf ∗ bf + wm ∗ bm. Normalizing the
market price and the total available time to unity, the optimal composite good of the
married couple reduces to:
Zm =
(wm + wf )
a+ wfbf + wmbm
. (2.3)
When the couple decides to terminate the marriage, for the single individual the
optimum amount of commodities is given by:
Zsi =
wi
a+ wi ∗ bi
for i = m, f. (2.4)
The different treatment of taxation faced by a married couple is included in the model
as a way of establishing the conditions under which a married couple decides to split.
In the presence of income taxes, for the married couple that files a joint return the
composite good is given by:
Zm =
(wm + wf )(1− τm)
a+ (wfbf + wmbm) ∗ (1− τm)
, (2.5)
where τm represents the tax faced by the married couple.
For the individuals that terminate their marriage by the end of the fiscal year
consumption of the composite good is affected by taxes as follows:
Zsi =
wi(1− τ s)
a+ wibi(1− τ s)
for i = m, f, (2.6)
where τ s represents the single tax rate faced by each person after divorce. Holding all
other factors constant, for any given tax rates (τm and τ s ), couples are more likely
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to terminate the marriage when the consumption of each person as single individuals,
Zs is greater than the share that each partner receives from the married output Zm.
With respect to the timing of the divorce decision, assuming that the couple
decides to terminate their marriage, then the decision of whether to divorce in period
t relative to period t+ 1, strictly depends on the difference between the two different
tax rates. If the couple divorces in period t, then each person will get Zs in period
t+ 1. On the other hand, if the couple terminates the marriage in period t+ 1, then
each one gets Zs taxed at the marriage tax rate τm. Thus, a lower marginal tax
rate on a divorced individual relative to the tax rate faced by the couple (i.e. τ s ¡
τm ) tends to decrease the tax liability and thus create beneficial incentives for early
marriage termination.
2.4 Data and Empirical Models
The empirical estimation uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). The PSID is a longitudinal survey that started with 4800 families in 1968
and it has grown to more than 7000 families by 2001. The longitudinal nature of the
survey, allows me to follow individuals and their marital status. Using the information
from the 1985 marital history I construct the data sample that facilitate the testing
of the hypothesis that different tax treatments between married couples and single
individuals have a significant effect on the likelihood to divorce and on the timing
decision of divorce. I use the time frame 1980 through 1996. The data available for
my analysis ends in 1996 because starting with the year 1997 the PSID survey is
conducted on a biennial basis and thus income data needed for tax computation is
not available.6
6Given the biennial feature of PSID after 1996, I am unable to get income data for the following
years: 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005. Although surveys were conducted during those years, it
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This time frame, hoverer, allows me to incorporate substantial variation in
the marginal tax rates because there have been significant changes in the federal tax
policy over this period. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA), The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 and
1993 (OBRA) constitute some of the major tax legislation acts that resulted in major
changes in the federal income tax. Rate schedules changed in 1981, 1986, 1990, 1993
and 2001. ERTA (1981) reduced the marginal income tax rates in the U.S. by 25% over
three years. The top rate was reduced from 70% to 50% while the bottom rate dropped
from 14% to 11%. These tax provisions become fully phased in 1983. The acts also
introduces new deductions for two-earner married couple. The lower-paid spouse is
allowed a 10 percent tax deduction on income up to $30,000, for a maximum deduction
of $3,000 and it reduces the marriage penalty. The secondary-earner deduction were
eliminated by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Additionally the top tax rate was lowered
from 50% to 28% while the bottom rate was raised from 11% to 15%. OBRA (1993)
icnreases the tax rates for high earners from 31% to 36%. Additionally, this act had
an impact on marriage penalty as provision of Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was
extended. The EITC is structured so that it diminishes as family income increases
and thus it can create incentive to not have an employed spouse in the home in order
to have a lower family income.
Empirical estimation of the effect of tax treatment on the timing decision
is performed using a restrictive sample that consists only of couples that decide to
terminate their marriage either in the last quarter (Q4) of the year t or the first
quarter (Q1) of the next year (t+ 1). Out of all 1628 divorced couples in the sample
from 1980 to 1996, 422 couples got a divorce in the first quarter and 401 couples
terminated their marriage in the fourth quarter. The idea is that marital choices,
should be noted that the surveys record income from the previous year.
52
at least in some cases, are flexible enough to adjust the timing of divorce across the
window of the last quarter of one year and the first quarter of the next.
If the divorce takes place at the end of year t instead of the beginning of year
t + 1, then each individual will file taxes as single and face the single tax rates. On
the other hand, if the couple divorces at the beginning of the next year, then they
file a joint return for period t.7 If the couple chooses to divorce in Q1 of year t + 1
and file jointly for year t, the tax liability is born jointly within the marriage. If the
couple chooses to divorce in Q4 of year t, I assume that the couple minimizes the
tax liability of the combined single returns by allocating deduction across the two
returns.
In this sense, I define a relative price variable that measures the marriage-tax
penalty. It is the ratio of the taxes the couple would pay filing singly and the taxes
that they would pay filing jointly for year t. Again the choice is to divorce in Q4, year
t versus Q1, year t + 1 based on the tax liabilities for year t. Let this marriage-tax
price be indicated by:
T =
T hs + T
w
s
T j
, (2.7)
where T j is the the joint-filing tax liability, and T hs is the tax liability for the husband
filing separately, and Tws is the tax liability for the wife filing separately.The model
suggests that as T goes down, it becomes less costly to stay married so more people
are likely to divorce in Q4.
For the given sample, I compute the marriage-tax price under two different
scenarios. First, I compute a tax liability ratio in which the spouse with the higher
income gets the dependents. Additionally, allowing for the spouse with the higher
7Divorced couples can still file as ”married filing separately”. However, I assume that individuals
are rational and act in their best interest. Thus, I believe that is safe to assume that they will each
agree to file under ”married filing jointly” status since the separate filing is less favorable.
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income to get the dependents and also to get the ”Head of Household” filing status,
I compute an additional marriage-tax relative price.8
Figure 2.1 presents the time trends for two divorce ratios and the computed
marriage-tax price. There are 2 divorces ratios that I compute from the marriage file
in PSID. First divorce ratio is the ratio of divorces taking place in the last quarter
of the year t to the total number of divorces taking place in the last quarter of year
t plus the divorces taking place in the first quarter of year t+1 (i.e. Qt
Qt+Qt+1
). The
second divorce ratio is computed as the ratio of total divorces taking place in the last
quarter of the year t to the total number of divorces taking place in the first quarter
of year t+1 (i.e. Qt
Qt+1
). If the different tax treatment of married couples versus single
individuals has an impact on the timing decision of divorce, then we should observe
that the ratio of couples accelerating the divorce decision is increasing at the same
time the marriage-tax price decreases.
The empirical model developed in this paper investigates the empirical mag-
nitude of the effect of tax savings on a couple’s decision to accelerate divorce into
period t rather than postpone it until period t + 1. Parametric estimation for the
timing decision is modeled by the following logit model:
Pr[Di = 1|Z1j, ..., Zkj] =
1
1 + exp(−∑ki=1 β0i Zij) , (2.8)
where Di = 1 represents the couple’s decision of getting a divorce in Q4 of year t.
The vector Zi incorporates variables that also may affect the timing of the divorce
decision for couple i. There are a number of things that are considered.
The literature on divorce has included the number of children under the age of
8According to the IRS, a person can claim the ”Head of Household” filing status if the following
criteria are met: the person is unmarried, there are dependents that live in the same house, and the
person paid more than half the cost of keeping up the home.
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five as a negative factor on divorce. While the literature has looked at divorce overall,
small children may influence the timing of divorce around the turn of the year. Parents
may wish to have one more Christmas together for the sake of the children. Thus,
I predict that the presence of small children should be correlated with first quarter
rather than fourth quarter divorces. Another, similar factor is religion. If couples are
of the same religion, the holiday season and the associated religious ceremony may
cause couples to postpone divorce into the new year.
Education and the length of the marriage may also influence the choice. I
expect that more highly educated couples will be more cognizant about the relative
tax cost of a late divorce compared to an early one. Also, I imagine that for marriages
that have lasted a long time, the divorce decision is more flexible.
Finally, I consider the effect of income. Income level reflects the level of earn-
ings for each spouse during the entire year. Irrespective of which quarter the divorce
takes place, income is recorded for year t since tax liability is computed based on the
level of income earned in that year.9 I have information on the income of both spouses
and this is an important part of the choice set that I am analyzing. First, higher com-
bined income means that more money is at stake in the marriage-tax penalty. So I
would expect that couples with high combined income to be more sensitive to the
tax-cost of delaying divorce. However, the relative income of one spouse to the other
is also a factor. In the limit, for marriages in which the wife does not work (80 percent
in my sample) there is no marriage tax.
9Tax liability for a couple divorcing in last quarter is based on earned income in that year, while
tax liability for couple terminating marriage in the first quarter of next coming year is still based in
income earned in the previous year.
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2.5 Results
Summary statistics for the relevant control variables are presented in Table
2.1. Although the original data sample included 823 couples that divorce in the first
or the fourth quarter, the empirical estimation is based on a reduced sample of 548
couples when I control for the level of education for the primary earner. This sample
is further reduced to 371 couples when I control for the combined level of education
of the partners because of significant amount of missing observations for the spouse’s
education. The significant reduction in sample size arises from the fact that I exclude
all couples with missing income information, as well as all couples for which the
computed tax liability of the couple that files a joint return, or the tax liability of
each partner filing as single is zero such that the relative marriage tax price cannot
be computed.10 Missing observations or unrecorded level of education are replaced
by the minimum level of education (i.e. 4 years of education).
The current study analyzes the magnitude of the effect of tax savings on a
couple’s decision to accelerate divorce within the framework of a logit regression
where the dependent variable is 1 if the couple accelerates the divorce into period t
and 0 otherwise (i.e. postpone the divorce until t + 1). The current sample consists
of both types of couples and Table 2.2 provides a summary description of the income
and tax related characteristics for the couples that face a marriage penalty, as well
as for the couples that find it in their best interest to stay married and postpone the
divorce decision. Given the marriage-tax price, we can see that there is a marriage
penalty for those couples that have T < 1 and a marriage subsidy for those with T
>1. Based on the characteristics from Table 2.2, couples that face a penalty from
10There are 247 couples for which the relative marriage tax penalty cannot be computed as income
information is unavailable for both the husband or the wife. Moreover, 19 observations are dropped
due to missing values for the level of education of the primary earner.
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postponing the divorce are couples in which on average the wife (or the secondary
earner of the household) has significantly higher income. This fact is consistent with
the pre existing findings that the closer the earnings of the partners are the larger
the marriage penalty is.
The constructed sample for the empirical analysis consists of couples that have
a combined income that ranges from a low $273 to a high $512,325. For some of the
couples in the sample the marriage-tax price is significantly large. Table 2.3 presents
the six couples for which the marriage-tax price is such that the joint tax liability
of the couple is significantly lower than the tax liability when filing singly. More
precisely, the relative price of the first couple included is 88% larger than the price
faced by the couple with the prior largest price (i.e. T=9.2). These couples benefit
from a large marriage subsidy and at least one of the spouses has an incentive to
postpone the divorce and minimize his or her tax liability. In my estimation, I first
look at the impact of the tax liability when these couples are excluded from the sample
as they are mostly outliers and their inclusion might lead to inconsistent results. I
also perform an additional analysis in which these couples are included in the sample.
For the given sample considered, Table 2.4 reports estimates for different spec-
ifications considered while Table 2.5 reports the marginal effects evaluated at the
means of the relevant independent variables. In Table 2.5, columns 1, 3, 5 and 7
report the estimates of a simple linear probability model while logit estimates are
reported in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8. It should be noted that estimations in Panel a use
the level of education for the primary earner as a control variable while estimations
in Panel b control for the combined level of education in the couple. Due to a signif-
icant amount of missing observations for the spouse’s education the analyzed sample
is significantly smaller.
The main variable of interest, the marriage-tax relative price, is statistically
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significant across all models. The computed estimates provide some evidence that
individuals do respond to changes in the marriage-tax penalty and as the relative
ratio goes down then the relative value of divorcing early goes up and more people
are likely to divorce in Q4. This effect is present regardless of the two different
scenarios considered in computing marriage-tax relative price. However, the results
show that the effect is slightly larger when including the possibility of filing as ”Head of
Household”. Using the level of education for the primary earner, the linear probability
model suggests that 100 percent increase in the relative marriage-tax price reduces the
probability of accelerating the divorce into the last quarter by 1.7 percent. Allowing
for ”Head of Household” reduces the probability of accelerating divorce by 2 percent.
Similar effects, but of slightly lower magnitude, are present when estimation controls
for the combined level of education in the couple.
Table 2.5 records the marginal effects computed at the mean of the independent
variables for the logit framework. For the significant coefficients mentioned above,
the marginal effects are precisely estimated and have low standard errors. Based on
those computed effects, on average 100 percent increase in the relative marriage-tax
price is going to reduce the probability of accelerating the divorce by 3.2 percent when
the price is computed as in ”Scenario a” and it is going to decrease the probability
of accelerated divorce by 3.7 percent when the price is computed as in ”Scenario b”.
Similar effects are reported when the combined level of education is controlled for.
Regarding the estimated effect for the number of children, the duration of the
marriage, the religious match, and the level of education, those variables turn out
not to be significant in any of the specifications considered. The level of combined
income for the two spouses has a significant effect on the probability of accelerating
the divorce regardless of the way the marriage-tax price is computed but only when
the linear probability framework is considered. On a similar note, the estimated
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coefficient for the income ratio is statistically significant in most of the cases and the
signs of this estimate indicate that the likelihood of getting a divorce by the end of
year t decreases as the income ratio increases (i.e. as the income of the secondary
earner increases).
For the main variable of interest, including the six couples that face a signifi-
cant marriage subsidy such that the primary earner has a great incentive to postpone
the divorce decision, reduces the impact of the marriage tax price such that the prob-
ability of accelerating divorce is reduced. These results are present in Table 2.6, Panel
B. The probability of accelerating the divorce when the relative marriage tax price
doubles decreases by 1.1 percent when the price is computed as in Scenario a and by
1.7 percent when the relative price is computed under the assumptions in Scenario b.
As couples with larger income, a longer marriage, and a higher level of edu-
cation are more likely to accelerate the divorce decision I analyze the impact of the
relative marriage tax price while allowing for this price to be directly related to the
level of income, education and marriage duration. The main estimates presented in
Table 2.7 are computed by allowing for different specification (i.e. price interacted
with income, education and marriage duration). The estimated effect for each inter-
action is computed such that the effect of one variable depends on the magnitude of
the other independent variable that is interacted with (i.e. the effect of the relative
tax price depends on the level of income). Computed at the mean level of each inter-
acted variable, results confirm that income, marriage duration and education together
with the marriage penalty have a significant effect on the decision of accelerating the
marriage dissolution. For the couples with an average level of combined income, an
increase in the relative marriage tax price reduces the probability of divorcing in the
last quarter by 6.2 percent. Similar impact is present for couples with an average
level of income and education while the probability of accelerating the divorce falls
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to 7.6 percent when I also include the interaction between tax price and marriage
duration. Allowing for interaction effects also solves the problem of the potential
outliers. Results suggests that for couples with average level of combined income
an increase in the relative marriage tax price reduces the probability of accelerating
divorce by 4 percent when estimation includes the six couples that face a significantly
large marriage subsidy. Similar effects are present when I control for the spouses’
combined level of education.
2.6 Conclusion
The results of the current paper provide additional evidence that marriage
penalty does matter and does induce changes in individuals’ behavior. The current
study shows evidence that the marriage-tax penalty had large and significant effects in
the timing decision of the divorce. It created significant incentives for early marriage
termination.
The estimation results of this study provide evidence that individuals do re-
spond to tax incentives and changes in the marriage tax penalty alters the relative
value of divorcing early. Estimation results suggest that one percent increase in the
relative marriage-tax price is going to reduce the probability of accelerating the di-
vorce by 3.2 percent when the price is computed under the assumption that the
spouse with the higher income gets the dependents. The effect is slightly larger (i.e.
3.7 percent) when the relative marriage-tax price is computed under the assumption
that the spouse with the higher income gets the dependents and also gets the ”Head
of Household” filing status.
In short, when the relative marriage tax price goes down it becomes less costly
to stay married so couples are more likely to accelerate their divorce and terminate the
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marriage by the end of the year. This effect is present regardless of the two different
scenarios considered in computing marriage-tax relative price, and the results show
that the effect is slightly larger when including the possibility of filing as ”Head of
Household”.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Divorce 545 0.433 0.496 0 1
Combined Income 545 32548.92 31445.94 273.11 512325
Income Ratio 545 0.061 0.137 0 0.5
Children (Under 5) 545 0.514 0.664 0 4
Religion Match 545 0.422 0.494 0 1
Education (Primary Earner) 545 10.536 4.142 4 17
Education (Combined) 374 22.211 6.564 4 34
Exemptions 545 1.728 1.205 1 7
Tax Liability Ratio a 545 0.631 2.954 -38.844 9.934
Tax Liability Ratio b 545 0.513 3.245 -38.844 9.934
Notes: The time frame is 1980 through 1996. Income and tax related values are in 1996 dollars. The variable Tax
Liability Ratio a refers to the scenario in which the primary earner gets the dependents. Similarly, the variable Tax
Liability Ratio b refers to the scenario in which the primary earner gets both the dependents and the ”Head of
Household” filing status. Due to a significant amount of missing observations for the spouse’s education the
analyzed sample is significantly smaller when the educational level considered is the combined level of education.
IncomeRatio = Secondary Earner
′s Income
Combined Income
.
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Table 2.2: Distribution of Income and Tax Related Variables by Marriage-Tax Price
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel a: Tax Liability Ratio a<1
Tax Liability Ratio a 220 -0.714 4.131 -38.844 0.996
Wife Income 220 6133.56 10847.41 0.00 72658.74
Head Income 220 20619.17 13362.51 409.67 130479.80
Combined Income 220 26752.74 22194.19 1638.68 179409.40
Joint Tax Liability 220 2165.94 5186.66 -2201.91 44617.26
Head Tax Liability 220 2484.85 3206.32 0.00 33778.98
Wife Tax Liability 220 658.12 1675.77 -283.62 15594.01
Panel b: Tax Liability Ratio a>1
Tax Liability Ratio a 290 2.440 6.824 1.015 106.350
Wife Income 391 2428.04 18980.46 0.00 349831.00
Head Income 391 28112.85 25668.31 0.00 162494.00
Combined Income 391 30540.89 35339.82 0.00 512325.00
Joint Tax Liability 391 3782.91 10018.48 -1047.38 175227.50
Head Tax Liability 391 4819.84 6637.87 -318.29 45997.19
Wife Tax Liability 391 505.87 5993.67 0.00 116524.60
Panel c: Tax Liability Ratio b<1
Tax Liability Ratio b 238 -0.796 4.434 -38.844 0.993
Wife Income 238 5897.55 11001.34 0.00 72658.74
Head Income 238 21577.53 13626.17 409.67 130479.80
Combined Income 238 27475.07 22031.87 1638.68 179409.40
Joint Tax Liability 238 2315.96 5118.01 -2201.91 44617.26
Head Tax Liability 238 2678.31 3232.12 0.00 33778.98
Wife Tax Liability 238 651.37 1735.87 -283.62 15594.01
Panel d: Tax Liability Ratio b>1
Tax Liability Ratio b 272 2.486 7.088 1.007 107.110
Wife Income 373 2399.81 19242.44 0.00 349831.00
Head Income 373 27862.98 26141.75 0.00 162494.00
Combined Income 373 30262.79 35950.91 0.00 512325.00
Joint Tax Liability 373 3765.21 10224.72 -1047.38 175227.50
Head Tax Liability 373 4809.08 6773.49 -318.29 45997.19
Wife Tax Liability 373 502.83 6115.22 0.00 116524.60
Notes: The time frame is 1980 through 1996. Income and tax related values are in 1996 dollars. Tax Liability Ratio
a refers to the scenario in which the primary earner gets the dependents. Similarly, the variable Tax Liability Ratio
b refers to the scenario in which the primary earner gets both the dependents and the ”Head of Household” filing
status. Tax Liability Ratio a<1 and Tax Liability Ratio b<1 suggest that the couple faces a marriage penalty. Tax
Liability Ratio a>1 and Tax Liability Ratio b>1 suggest that the couple gets a marriage subsidy.
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Table 2.3: Income and Tax Related Values for Marriage-Tax Price Possible Outliers
Tax Liability Wife Head Combined Joint Head Tax Wife Tax
Ratio a Income Income Income Tax Liability Liability
17.28245 0 19936.97 19936.97 49.48799 1985.39 0
22.18644 0 20528.15 20528.15 38.24718 2066.32 0
22.18644 0 20528.15 20528.15 38.24718 2066.32 0
22.18644 0 20528.15 20528.15 38.24718 2066.32 0
24.18182 0 15385.8 15385.8 17.81513 1402.537 0
106.3504 0 9286.014 9286.014 -20.17353 382.1103 0
Notes: The time frame is 1980 through 1996. Income and tax related values are in 1996 dollars. Those are the five
couples for which the marriage-tax price is significantly large.
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Table 2.4: Regression Results for the Probability to Divorce in the 4th Quarter
Panel a: Estimated Coefficients with Education of Primary Earner
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Logit OLS Logit
Children (under 5) 0.043 0.18 0.04 0.175
-0.032 -0.133 -0.032 -0.134
Religion Match -0.021 -0.092 -0.022 -0.099
-0.043 -0.181 -0.043 -0.182
Education (Primary Earner) 0.007 0.027 0.007 0.027
-0.005 -0.023 -0.005 -0.023
Length 0 0.002 0 0.002
0 -0.002 0 -0.002
Combined Income (ln) 0.042* 0.185* 0.043* 0.196*
-0.025 -0.11 -0.025 -0.111
Income Ratio 0.183 0.723 0.185 0.712
-0.167 -0.688 -0.166 -0.688
Tax Liability Ratio a -0.017** -0.082**
-0.007 -0.037
Tax Liability Ratio b -0.020*** -0.114***
-0.006 -0.041
Constant -0.098 -2.561** -0.105 -2.640**
-0.26 -1.129 -0.259 -1.141
R Square /Pseudo R Square 0.0270 0.0206 0.0343 0.0275
Obs 548 548 548 548
Panel b: Estimated Coefficients with Combined Education
(5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Logit OLS Logit
Children (under 5) 0.069* 0.289* 0.066* 0.283*
-0.037 -0.156 -0.037 -0.157
Religion Match -0.015 -0.066 -0.016 -0.073
-0.053 -0.218 -0.053 -0.219
Education (Combined) 0.004 0.018 0.004 0.018
-0.004 -0.017 -0.004 -0.017
Length 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003
-0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
Combined Income (ln) 0.036 0.155 0.037 0.161
-0.031 -0.133 -0.031 -0.134
Income Ratio -0.14 -0.6 -0.135 -0.601
-0.257 -1.064 -0.256 -1.065
Tax Liability Ratio a -0.015** -0.073*
-0.007 -0.039
Tax Liability Ratio b -0.018*** -0.100**
-0.007 -0.042
Constant -0.077 -2.438* -0.085 -2.502*
-0.304 -1.301 -0.303 -1.312
R Square /Pseudo R Square 0.0320 0.0242 0.0394 0.0250
Obs 371 371 371 371
Notes: The time frame is 1980 through 1996. Income and tax related values are in 1996 dollars. Standard errors in parentheses.
IncomeRatio =
Secondary Earner′s Income
Combined Income
. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 2.5: Marginal Effects for the Probability to Divorce in the 4th Quarter Com-
puted at the Mean of the Relevant Independent Variables
Panel a: Estimated Elasticities with Education of Primary Earner
(2) (4)
Mean m.e. s.e. m.e. s.e.
Children (under 5) 0.511 0.052 (0.038) 0.050 (0.039)
Religion Match 0.422 -0.022 (0.043) -0.024 (0.043)
Education (Primary Earner) 10.558 0.163 (0.135) 0.160 (0.135)
Length 62.582 0.060 (0.072) 0.058 (0.072)
Combined Income (ln) 10.076 1.054* (0.629) 1.111* (0.635)
Income Ratio 0.061 0.025 (0.024) 0.024 (0.024)
Tax Liability Ratio a 0.694 -0.032** (0.015)
Tax Liability Ratio b -0.037*** (0.013)
Panel b: Estimated Elasticities with Combined Education
(6) (8)
Mean m.e. s.e. m.e. s.e.
Children (under 5) 0.523 0.083* (0.045) 0.082 (0.045)
Religion Match 0.426 -0.016 (0.051) -0.017 (0.051)
Education (Combined) 22.189 0.220 (0.210) 0.226 (0.210)
Length 70.415 0.119 (0.095) 0.119 (0.095)
Combined Income (ln) 10.007 0.857* (0.737) 0.890 (0.743)
Income Ratio 0.033 -0.011 (0.019) -0.011 (0.019)
Tax Liability Ratio a 0.575 -0.023* (0.012)
Tax Liability Ratio b -0.023*** (0.010)
Notes: The time frame is 1980 through 1996. Income and tax related values are in 1996 dollars. Standard errors in
parentheses. m.e stands for marginal effect; s.e stands for standard error. Marginal effects are computed at the
reported means. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Figure 2.1: Average Marriage Tax Price and Divorce Ratio: Trends by Year
Notes: Tax Liability Ratio a refers to the scenario in which the primary earner gets the dependents.
Similarly, the variable Tax Liability Ratio b refers to the scenario in which the primary earner gets
both the dependents and the ”Head of Household” filing status. The marriage-tax price is computed as:
T =
T hs +T
w
s
T j
. There are 2 divorces ratios that I compute from the marriage file in PSID. First divorce
ratio is the ratio of divorces taking place in the last quarter of the year t to the total number of divorces
taking place in the last quarter of year t plus the divorces taking place in the first quarter of year t+1
(i.e. Qt
Qt+Qt+1
). The second divorce ratio is computed as the ratio of total divorces taking place in the
last quarter of the year t to the total number of divorces taking place in the first quarter of year t+1 (i.e.
Qt
Qt+1
).
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Appendix A
Current Population Survey Sample
Selection
The empirical analysis uses data from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
from 1997 to 2008. The CPS is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households. Each
household in the CPS is interviewed each month for 4 consecutive months, then
ignored for 8 months, then interviewed again for 4 more months. This appendix
describes the sample selection in detail using the CPS 2001 as an example.
There are a total of 1,742,243 observation in the 2001 annual CPS. Out of
all the individuals in this sample, 30,166 are non-citizen Mexicans. Imposing the
restriction for the Mexicans to have arrived in the United States after the year 1987,
the sample reduces to 20,945 observations. The sample is further restricted as each
non-citizen Mexican has to have lived in the country for at least as many years as are
required to satisfy state eligibility requirements for in-state tuition. For the states of
New York and Oklahoma I impose a 2 year restriction. For New Mexico I impose a
1 year restriction. For the other seven states that adopt in-state tuition, I use a 3
year restriction. Satisfying the residency requirements, the sample reduces to 14,402
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observations. Out of 14,402 individual observations, there are 1,796 individuals with
ages between 18 and 22 years old. Same restrictions are imposed for the other non-
citizen groups considered in the paper: the non-Latino immigrants and non-Mexican
Latino immigrants.
The sample includes tuition data for both undergraduate public universities
and community colleges. However, the sample does not include tuition information
for community colleges in North Dakota as data is not available for all years. For this
year, there will be observations missed as there are no observations for non-citizen
Mexicans satisfying the above requirements. On a similar note, undergraduate tuition
for universities and colleges does not include the states of Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii
and Wyoming due to lack of consistent tuition series for those states. Thus, all five
states mentioned above are dropped from the analysis. For this year, there are no
observations missed for the states Alaska and Wyoming. 16 observations are missed
as there are 13 observation in Delaware and 3 in Hawaii that are dropped due to
inconsistency in tuition series.
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Appendix B
Enacted Legislation for In-State
Tuition
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Table B.1: States that Offer In-State Tuition to Undocumented Immigrants
State Date Date Residency State Aid
Passed Enacted Requirement Offered
Texas June, 2001 June, 2001 3 Years Yes
California October, 2001 January, 2002 3 Years No
Utah March, 2002 July, 2002 3 Years Yes
New York* June, 2002 August, 2003 2 Years No
Washington May, 2003 July, 2003 3 Years No
Oklahoma May, 2003 May, 2003 2 Years Yes
Illinois May, 2003 May, 2003 3 Years No
Kansas May, 2004 July, 2004 3 Years No
New Mexico April, 2005 April, 2005 1 Year No
Nebraska April, 2006 April, 2006 3 Years No
Source: Olivas (2009) and National Immigration Law Center (2003).
Notes: New York has offered in-state tuition since 1996.
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Appendix C
Level of Tuition by State
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Table C.1: Average Value of Tuition by State
Public University Community College
In-State Out-of-State In-State Out-of-State
States that Adopted Policy
California 7.930 9.449 6.301 8.585
Illinois 8.620 9.348 7.593 9.159
Kansas 8.071 9.209 7.508 8.065
Nebraska 8.222 8.799 7.511 7.731
New Mexico 7.830 9.134 6.850 7.726
New York 8.557 9.353 8.117 8.765
Oklahoma 7.942 8.812 7.571 8.466
Texas 8.259 9.405 7.234 7.962
Utah 7.969 9.068 7.602 8.847
Washington 8.285 9.490 7.734 8.991
States that Proposed Policy
Florida 8.059 9.555 7.514 8.815
New Jersey 8.997 9.467 7.998 8.741
States that Ban Policy
Arizona 8.199 9.491 7.149 8.783
Colorado 8.080 9.351 7.774 9.153
Mean ln(Tuition) 8.354 9.343 7.608 8.688
Source: Higher Education Coordination Board Surveys
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Appendix D
Effect of the In-State Tuition
Subsidy under Different Scenarios
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Table D.1: Effect of In-State Tuition Subsidy by Age and State when Policy Becomes
Effective a Year after Enactment Date
Policy Effects Policy Effects Policy Effects
by Age Group by State by State and Age
Age 17 -0.036*** (0.008) California 0.020** (0.009) California
Age 18 0.016 (0.012) Illinois 0.011 (0.017) Age 17 -0.030*** (0.010)
Age 19 0.020 (0.013) Kansas -0.091*** (0.026) Age 18 0.022 (0.014)
Age 20 0.038*** (0.011) Nebraska -0.030 (0.035) Age 19 0.025* (0.014)
Age 21 0.024** (0.010) New Mexico -0.022 (0.025) Age 20 0.044*** (0.013)
Age 22 0.012 (0.009) New York 0.034** (0.016) Age 21 0.029** (0.012)
Oklahoma 0.026 (0.026) Age 22 0.018* (0.011)
Texas 0.016 (0.012) Illinois
Utah 0.015 (0.015) Age 17 -0.039** (0.017)
Washington 0.067*** (0.021) Age 18 0.013 (0.020)
Age 19 0.016 (0.020)
Age 20 0.035* (0.019)
Age 21 0.020 (0.019)
Age 22 0.009 (0.017)
Kansas
Age 17 -0.136*** (0.027)
Age 18 -0.084*** (0.028)
Age 19 -0.081*** (0.029)
Age 20 -0.062** (0.028)
Age 21 -0.077*** (0.028)
Age 22 -0.088*** (0.027)
Nebraska
Age 17 -0.083** (0.036)
Age 18 -0.031 (0.037)
Age 19 -0.029 (0.037)
Age 20 -0.010 (0.036)
Age 21 -0.024 (0.037)
Age 22 -0.036 (0.036)
New Mexico
Age 17 -0.069*** (0.025)
Age 18 -0.017 (0.027)
Age 19 -0.014 (0.027)
Age 20 0.005 (0.026)
Age 21 -0.010 (0.026)
Age 22 -0.021 (0.026)
New York
Age 17 -0.013 (0.017)
Age 18 0.039** (0.019)
Age 19 0.041** (0.019)
Age 20 0.060*** (0.018)
Age 21 0.046*** (0.017)
Age 22 0.034** (0.017)
Oklahoma
Age 17 -0.026 (0.027)
Age 18 0.026 (0.028)
Age 19 0.029 (0.028)
Age 20 0.048* (0.027)
Age 21 0.033 (0.027)
Age 22 0.022 (0.027)
Texas
Age 17 -0.034*** (0.013)
Age 18 0.018 (0.015)
Age 19 0.021 (0.016)
Age 20 0.040*** (0.015)
Age 21 0.025* (0.014)
Age 22 0.014 (0.013)
Utah
Age 17 -0.035** (0.016)
Age 18 0.017 (0.018)
Age 19 0.020 (0.018)
Age 20 0.039** (0.017)
Age 21 0.024 (0.017)
Age 22 0.012 (0.016)
Washington
Age 17 0.015 (0.021)
Age 18 0.067*** (0.023)
Age 19 0.070*** (0.023)
Age 20 0.089*** (0.023)
Age 21 0.074*** (0.022)
Age 22 0.062*** (0.021)
Notes: Policy becomes effective one year after enactment date. The sample of analysis is restricted to non-citizen
Mexicans young adults who entered the U.S. after 1987.Sample is restricted to 17-22 years old persons in the
analyses on currently attending college. Estimation controls for age, gender, marital status, race, month of the year,
state and year fixed effects, monthly state unemployment rate and the proportion of the non-Hispanic White
population with at least some college education. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The aggregate impact of
the policy is 0.014 and is statistically significant at 5 percent. Those results are available upon request. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table D.2: Effect of In-State Tuition Subsidy by Age and State when Policy Becomes
Effective on Enactment Date
Policy Effects Policy Effects Policy Effects
by Age Group by State by State and Age
Age 17 -0.038*** (0.013) California 0.029*** (0.009) California
Age 18 0.008 (0.016) Illinois -0.033** (0.016) Age 17 -0.017 (0.014)
Age 19 0.017 (0.020) Kansas -0.102*** (0.037) Age 18 0.027* (0.016)
Age 20 0.035** (0.018) Nebraska -0.000 (0.021) Age 19 0.037* (0.020)
Age 21 0.013 (0.015) New Mexico -0.026 (0.030) Age 20 0.055*** (0.017)
Age 22 0.004 (0.012) New York -0.009 (0.015) Age 21 0.032** (0.015)
Oklahoma 0.028 (0.028) Age 22 0.025** (0.012)
Texas 0.016 (0.011) Illinois
Utah 0.019 (0.017) Age 17 -0.078*** (0.019)
Washington 0.049** (0.025) Age 18 -0.034 (0.023)
Age 19 -0.025 (0.023)
Age 20 -0.006 (0.023)
Age 21 -0.029 (0.021)
Age 22 -0.037** (0.018)
Kansas
Age 17 -0.142*** (0.037)
Age 18 -0.098*** (0.038)
Age 19 -0.089** (0.041)
Age 20 -0.070* (0.040)
Age 21 -0.093** (0.038)
Age 22 -0.101*** (0.037)
Nebraska
Age 17 -0.048** (0.024)
Age 18 -0.004 (0.026)
Age 19 0.005 (0.025)
Age 20 0.024 (0.027)
Age 21 0.001 (0.025)
Age 22 -0.007 (0.023)
New Mexico
Age 17 -0.070** (0.030)
Age 18 -0.026 (0.034)
Age 19 -0.017 (0.035)
Age 20 0.002 (0.034)
Age 21 -0.021 (0.032)
Age 22 -0.029 (0.032)
New York
Age 17 -0.055*** (0.019)
Age 18 -0.011 (0.020)
Age 19 -0.001 (0.023)
Age 20 0.017 (0.024)
Age 21 -0.005 (0.018)
Age 22 -0.013 (0.018)
Oklahoma
Age 17 -0.018 (0.030)
Age 18 0.026 (0.033)
Age 19 0.036 (0.033)
Age 20 0.054* (0.033)
Age 21 0.032 (0.032)
Age 22 0.024 (0.030)
Texas
Age 17 -0.030* (0.015)
Age 18 0.014 (0.016)
Age 19 0.024 (0.022)
Age 20 0.042** (0.018)
Age 21 0.019 (0.016)
Age 22 0.012 (0.013)
Utah
Age 17 -0.026 (0.020)
Age 18 0.018 (0.022)
Age 19 0.028 (0.024)
Age 20 0.046** (0.023)
Age 21 0.023 (0.020)
Age 22 0.016 (0.020)
Washington
Age 17 0.002 (0.026)
Age 18 0.046 (0.028)
Age 19 0.055* (0.029)
Age 20 0.074** (0.029)
Age 21 0.051* (0.027)
Age 22 0.043* (0.025)
Notes: Policy becomes effective on the enactment date. The sample of analysis is restricted to non-citizen Mexicans
young adults who entered the U.S. after 1987.Sample is restricted to 17-22 years old persons in the analyses on
currently attending college. Estimation controls for age, gender, marital status, race, month of the year, state and
year fixed effects, monthly state unemployment rate and the proportion of the non-Hispanic White population with
at least some college education. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The aggregate impact of the policy is 0.008
and is not statistically significant. Those results are available upon request. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table D.3: Effect of In-State Tuition Subsidy by Age and State when Policy Becomes
Effective a Year after Enactment Date using Kaushal(2008) data sample
Policy Effects Policy Effects Policy Effects
by Age Group by State by State and Age
Age 17 -0.032* (0.017) California 0.044*** (0.012) California
Age 18 0.045* (0.027) Illinois -0.034 (0.031) Age 17 -0.013 (0.019)
Age 19 0.040 (0.028) Kansas -0.031 (0.030) Age 18 0.063** (0.026)
Age 20 0.042 (0.027) Nebraska 0.016 (0.019) Age 19 0.059** (0.027)
Age 21 0.028 (0.029) New Mexico 0.016 (0.019) Age 20 0.062** (0.026)
Age 22 0.022 (0.021) New York 0.016 (0.019) Age 21 0.048 (0.031)
Oklahoma -0.016 (0.029) Age 22 0.042* (0.022)
Texas 0.012 (0.014) Illinois
Utah 0.019 (0.020) Age 17 -0.091*** (0.033)
Washington 0.030 (0.023) Age 18 -0.014 (0.038)
Age 19 -0.019 (0.040)
Age 20 -0.015 (0.042)
Age 21 -0.030 (0.040)
Age 22 -0.036 (0.035)
Kansas
Age 17 -0.074** (0.031)
Age 18 0.002 (0.040)
Age 19 -0.002 (0.038)
Age 20 0.001 (0.038)
Age 21 -0.013 (0.042)
Age 22 -0.020 (0.034)
Nebraska
Age 17 -0.038 (0.025)
Age 18 0.038 (0.030)
Age 19 0.034 (0.031)
Age 20 0.037 (0.030)
Age 21 0.023 (0.033)
Age 22 0.017 (0.025)
New Mexico
Age 17 -0.038 (0.025)
Age 18 0.038 (0.030)
Age 19 0.034 (0.031)
Age 20 0.037 (0.030)
Age 21 0.023 (0.033)
Age 22 0.017 (0.025)
New York
Age 17 -0.038 (0.025)
Age 18 0.038 (0.030)
Age 19 0.034 (0.031)
Age 20 0.037 (0.030)
Age 21 0.023 (0.033)
Age 22 0.017 (0.025)
Oklahoma
Age 17 -0.086** (0.033)
Age 18 -0.009 (0.035)
Age 19 -0.014 (0.040)
Age 20 -0.010 (0.038)
Age 21 -0.025 (0.042)
Age 22 -0.031 (0.038)
Texas
Age 17 -0.046*** (0.018)
Age 18 0.030 (0.026)
Age 19 0.026 (0.032)
Age 20 0.029 (0.028)
Age 21 0.015 (0.028)
Age 22 0.008 (0.023)
Utah
Age 17 -0.040 (0.026)
Age 18 0.036 (0.035)
Age 19 0.032 (0.034)
Age 20 0.035 (0.032)
Age 21 0.021 (0.034)
Age 22 0.014 (0.027)
Washington
Age 17 -0.024 (0.026)
Age 18 0.052 (0.035)
Age 19 0.048 (0.037)
Age 20 0.051 (0.036)
Age 21 0.037 (0.032)
Age 22 0.030 (0.029)
Notes: Kaushal(2008)’s sample uses CPS MORG data from 1997-2005. Policy becomes effective one year after the
enactment date. The sample of analysis is restricted to non-citizen Mexicans young adults who entered the U.S.
after 1987. Estimation controls for age, gender, marital status, race, month of the year, state and year fixed effects,
monthly state unemployment rate, the proportion of the non-Hispanic White population with at least some college
education, as well as the proportion of non-citizen Mexicans with at least a high-school degree. Robust and
clustered standard errors in parentheses. The aggregate impact of the policy is 0.025 and is statistically significant
at 5 percent. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Main Regression Coefficients
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Table F.1: Regression Coefficients using Public Univer-
sity Prices for Non-Citizen Mexican Immigrants aged 18
to 20 years old
Variable Coefficient Std. Error P.Value
In-State Tuition -0.057 0.082 0.487
Out-of-State Tuition -0.060 0.102 0.560
In-State Tuition*Policy -0.035 0.049 0.477
Out-of-State Tuition*Policy 0.213 0.091 0.019
Policy -1.681 0.833 0.044
Age 19 0.037 0.008 0.000
Age 20 0.018 0.007 0.011
Female 0.048 0.027 0.069
Married Army Forces -0.032 0.035 0.356
Married Spouse Absent 0.094 0.020 0.000
Widowed 0.063 0.020 0.001
Divorced 0.031 0.050 0.531
Separated 0.028 0.026 0.278
Never Married 0.111 0.006 0.000
Years in the US 0.012 0.001 0.000
Unemployment -0.008 0.007 0.228
Non Hispanic Proportion with College 0.027 0.025 0.274
Mexican Proportion with High School 0.038 0.029 0.195
Year 1998 -0.087 0.032 0.006
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table F.1 – Continued
Variable Coefficient Std. Error P.Value
Year 1999 -0.062 0.035 0.073
Year 2000 -0.037 0.035 0.299
Year 2001 -0.008 0.035 0.820
Year 2002 -0.033 0.030 0.269
Year 2003 -0.030 0.026 0.242
Year 2004 -0.028 0.018 0.129
Year 2005 (dropped)
Year 2006 -0.053 0.031 0.088
Year 2007 -0.029 0.021 0.174
Year 2008 (dropped)
Female*Year 1998 0.018 0.032 0.574
Female*Year 1999 0.041 0.036 0.254
Female*Year 2000 -0.048 0.032 0.136
Female*Year 2001 0.009 0.036 0.799
Female*Year 2002 0.004 0.032 0.892
Female*Year 2003 0.046 0.033 0.163
Female*Year 2004 0.016 0.031 0.603
Female*Year 2005 (dropped)
Female*Year 2006 0.013 0.031 0.679
Female*Year 2007 0.039 0.032 0.229
Female*Year 2008 0.003 0.032 0.929
Minimum Wage -0.014 0.008 0.071
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table F.1 – Continued
Variable Coefficient Std. Error P.Value
February -0.012 0.014 0.400
March -0.012 0.014 0.408
April -0.010 0.014 0.484
May -0.024 0.014 0.085
June -0.046 0.014 0.001
July -0.042 0.014 0.003
August -0.030 0.014 0.039
September 0.013 0.016 0.387
October 0.015 0.015 0.334
November 0.002 0.015 0.909
December 0.019 0.016 0.236
Fiscal Year 1997 (dropped)
Fiscal Year 1998 0.052 0.027 0.055
Fiscal Year 1999 0.074 0.029 0.010
Fiscal Year 2000 0.041 0.031 0.191
Fiscal Year 2001 0.023 0.030 0.451
Fiscal Year 2002 0.067 0.028 0.014
Fiscal Year 2003 0.033 0.024 0.162
Fiscal Year 2004 0.016 0.016 0.338
Fiscal Year 2005 (dropped)
Fiscal Year 2006 -0.015 0.038 0.695
Fiscal Year 2007 -0.016 0.032 0.602
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table F.1 – Continued
Variable Coefficient Std. Error P.Value
Fiscal Year 2008 -0.031 0.021 0.146
Vermont (dropped)
Massachusetts -1269.822 556.386 0.022
Rhode Island -1190.388 555.076 0.032
Connecticut -1222.659 555.719 0.028
New York -1175.286 554.407 0.034
New Jersey -1202.491 554.635 0.030
Pennsylvania -1149.075 554.472 0.038
Ohio -1232.453 555.049 0.026
Indiana -1259.822 555.707 0.023
Illinois -1168.718 554.426 0.035
Michigan -1148.092 554.831 0.039
Wisconsin -1210.678 554.525 0.029
Minnesota -1183.485 554.322 0.033
Iowa -1134.939 554.564 0.041
Missouri -1205.558 554.575 0.030
North Dakota -856.687 567.998 0.132
South Dakota -1170.193 554.261 0.035
Nebraska -1185.971 554.636 0.033
Kansas -1153.448 554.521 0.038
Maryland -1273.462 554.947 0.022
Virginia -1183.509 554.587 0.033
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table F.1 – Continued
Variable Coefficient Std. Error P.Value
West Virginia -1157.768 554.682 0.037
North Carolina -1148.362 554.468 0.038
South Carolina -1199.452 554.510 0.031
Georgia -1186.872 554.255 0.032
Florida -1207.016 554.432 0.029
Kentucky -1167.377 554.721 0.035
Tennessee -1231.682 554.562 0.026
Alabama -1165.643 554.593 0.036
Mississippi -1160.627 554.463 0.036
Arkansas -1140.058 554.553 0.040
Louisiana -1181.309 554.507 0.033
Oklahoma -1213.022 554.646 0.029
Texas -1193.275 554.344 0.031
Idaho -1184.090 554.432 0.033
Colorado -1194.325 554.360 0.031
New Mexico -1176.676 554.483 0.034
Arizona -1160.709 554.390 0.036
Utah -1178.599 554.421 0.034
Nevada -1187.727 554.419 0.032
Washington -1200.593 554.360 0.030
Oregon -1196.422 554.414 0.031
California -1173.637 554.369 0.034
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table F.1 – Continued
Variable Coefficient Std. Error P.Value
Year -0.582 0.277 0.035
Year*Vermont 0.001 0.001 0.032
Year*Massachusetts 0.634 0.278 0.022
Year*Rhode Island 0.594 0.277 0.032
Year*Connecticut 0.610 0.277 0.028
Year*New York 0.587 0.277 0.034
Year*New Jersey 0.600 0.277 0.030
Year*Pennsylvania 0.574 0.277 0.038
Year*Ohio 0.615 0.277 0.026
Year*Indiana 0.629 0.277 0.023
Year*Illinois 0.584 0.277 0.035
Year*Michigan 0.573 0.277 0.039
Year*Wisconsin 0.604 0.277 0.029
Year*Minnesota 0.591 0.277 0.033
Year*Iowa 0.567 0.277 0.041
Year*Missouri 0.602 0.277 0.030
Year*North Dakota 0.428 0.284 0.131
Year*South Dakota 0.584 0.277 0.035
Year*Nebraska 0.592 0.277 0.033
Year*Kansas 0.576 0.277 0.038
Year*Maryland 0.636 0.277 0.022
Year*Virginia 0.591 0.277 0.033
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table F.1 – Continued
Variable Coefficient Std. Error P.Value
Year*West Virginia 0.578 0.277 0.037
Year*North Carolina 0.573 0.277 0.038
Year*South Carolina 0.599 0.277 0.031
Year*Georgia 0.593 0.277 0.032
Year*Florida 0.603 0.277 0.030
Year*Kentucky 0.583 0.277 0.035
Year*Tennessee 0.615 0.277 0.026
Year*Alabama 0.582 0.277 0.036
Year*Mississippi 0.579 0.277 0.036
Year*Arkansas 0.569 0.277 0.040
Year*Louisiana 0.590 0.277 0.033
Year*Oklahoma 0.606 0.277 0.029
Year*Texas 0.596 0.277 0.031
Year*Idaho 0.591 0.277 0.033
Year*Colorado 0.596 0.277 0.031
Year*New Mexico 0.587 0.277 0.034
Year*Arizona 0.579 0.277 0.036
Year*Utah 0.588 0.277 0.034
Year*Nevada 0.593 0.277 0.032
Year*Washington 0.599 0.277 0.030
Year*Oregon 0.597 0.277 0.031
Year*California 0.586 0.277 0.034
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table F.1 – Continued
Variable Coefficient Std. Error P.Value
Constant 1167.716 554.310 0.035
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